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ABSTRACT
Accounts of environmental law that rely on concepts of
environmental harm and environmental protection oversimplify the
tremendous variety of uses of environmental resources and the often
complex relationships among those uses. Such approaches are
analytically unclear and, more importantly, insert hidden normativity
into putatively descriptive claims. Instead of thinking about
environmental law in terms of preventing environmental harm,
environmental problems can be understood more specifically and
more meaningfully as disputes over conflicting uses of environmental
resources. This Article proposes a use-conflict framework as a means
of acquiring a deeper understanding of environmental problems and
lawmaking without favoring any particular normative approach. The
framework does not itself propose a resolution of any environmental
problems but rather describes environmental problems and
environmental lawmaking conceptually in a manner that exposes
normative claims and attempts to establish some common ground
across diverse normative perspectives.
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INTRODUCTION
Accounts of environmental law often invoke the concept of
environmental harm to explain environmental lawmaking. The goal
of environmental law, for example, frequently is characterized as
1
preventing environmental harm or protecting the environment. As a
1. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 1 (1999) (contending that
environmental laws reflect “a profound national commitment to environmental protection”);
Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the Fold with a
New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1999) (proposing that the first
step in the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decisionmaking should be to identify “a
pollutant or environmental harm to be addressed”); Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution:
Harmonizing International and Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 746 (2007)
(referring to environmental law’s “goal of protecting our natural environment”); Nicholas C.
Yost, Environmental Regulation—Are There Better Ways?, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 564, 571 (1999)
(stating that “the purpose of environmental laws” is to “preserve and enhance the environment”
(emphasis omitted)); Thomas Lundmark, Book Review, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171, 176
(1996) (“The primary purpose of environmental law is the protection of natural resources from
despoliation and degradation by pollution.”); About EPA, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/
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way of understanding environmental problems and environmental
law, however, environmental harm is often illusive and inefficacious,
oversimplifying many complex realities of environmental lawmaking.
Conceptualizing environmental law in terms of environmental
harm is not just analytically unclear. Environmental harm’s ambiguity
inserts hidden normativity into putatively descriptive claims. This is
because the concept of harm necessarily requires a comparison with
some normatively superior baseline condition. Environmental harm,
however, does not specify a baseline or justify the baseline’s
normative superiority over the harmed condition. Descriptions of
environmental harm thereby incorporate implicit normative
judgments in the form of unspecified and undefended baselines.
Ambiguous baselines, such as those embedded in environmental
harm, can be employed strategically, facilitating confusing and
conflicting claims. Because the premises of the claims are concealed,
those who encounter competing claims have no basis for resolving the
confusion or the apparent inconsistencies. In such situations, it would
be tremendously valuable to have an approach that does not assume a
particular normative viewpoint—that is, a way of thinking that can
serve as an honest broker among competing claims and ideas.
This Article argues that a use-conflict framework for
environmental law has promise as just such an honest broker. As an
alternative to an environmental-harm approach, environmental
problems can be understood more specifically and meaningfully in
terms of environmental uses, the various benefits people derive from
environmental resources. Such an approach avoids collapsing the
tremendous variety of uses of environmental resources—which affect
each other in ways that are complex and often poorly understood—
into broad, simple categories, such as environmental harm and
environmental protection. Environmental law is better understood as
a way of managing conflicting uses of environmental resources, rather
than simply as an effort to protect the environment from harm. In
short, environmental law is really about the relationships among
environmental uses.
In a previous article, I introduced the use-conflict framework as a
solution to the perceived conceptual incoherence of environmental

index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (“EPA’s mission is to protect human health and the
environment.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the EPA’s name, which references “environmental
protection,” rather than just “environmental,” demonstrates this tendency.
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2

law. That article contended that a legal field consists of a group of
situations unified by a pattern or set of patterns that is both common
3
within the field and distinctive from other areas of law. It argued that
for environmental law, the dominant pattern was the presence of
environmental resources that are public, physical, and pervasively
4
interrelated. Based on this claim, I proposed a use-conflict
framework that conceptualizes environmental lawmaking as the
5
management of conflicts among uses of environmental resources.
Here, my purpose in employing the use-conflict framework is
different. This Article proposes the use-conflict framework as a
means not merely of cohering environmental law but also of acquiring
a more complete and deeper understanding of environmental
problems and lawmaking. The use-conflict framework rests on three
core claims: (1) that uses of environmental resources are the
dominant driver of environmental disputes; (2) that environmental
disputes arise when environmental uses physically conflict; and (3)
that environmental lawmaking therefore is best understood as an
effort to manage conflicts among uses of environmental resources.
Thinking of environmental lawmaking in these terms allows an
analytical accuracy, clarity, and depth that is missing from other
approaches. These advantages are not just academic. How a legal
problem is conceptualized and communicated—that is, how it is
6
framed—affects people’s views of how the law should govern it. The
use-conflict framework provides an intellectual structure for
facilitating thoughtful analysis of and debate about issues of
environmental law in whatever context they arise. As such, it should
be useful to analysts of and participants in any debate or decision of
environmental lawmaking.
The use-conflict framework differs from standard accounts of
environmental law in that it is a descriptive, rather than normative,
2. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 275 (2010).
3. Id. at 241–45.
4. Id. at 264–69.
5. Id. at 275–76.
6. Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 313, 314 (2006) (“Framing effects may render [regulatory] instruments subject to criticism
to which other, competing instruments are not subject, even if in economic reality . . . the
competing instruments could be subjected to the same criticism.”); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453
(1981) (“We have obtained systematic reversals of preference by variations in the framing of
acts, contingencies, or outcomes.”).
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approach to environmental problems. It intentionally frames
environmental problems in a manner that is consistent with a broad
range of viewpoints. Its purpose is not to propose a resolution of any
environmental problems—such an argument necessarily would entail
a strong normative component—but rather to describe environmental
problems and environmental lawmaking in a manner that exposes
normativity and that attempts to establish some common ground
across diverse normative perspectives. Because the use-conflict
framework is descriptive and values-inclusive, it can serve as a neutral
baseline that enables fair comparisons of competing normative
claims—whether they are claims about a specific policy issue or
competing general normative perspectives—thereby facilitating more
thoughtful deliberation about the often difficult underlying issues of
environmental lawmaking.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the distinctive
characteristics of environmental problems and the drawbacks of
viewing those problems in terms of environmental harm. Part II
defines the use-conflict framework and shows why it explains
environmental lawmaking better than an environmental-harm
framework can. Part III explores the use-conflict framework’s
practical implications for environmental lawmaking and policy
analysis. Part IV examines how a use-conflict framework highlights
some of the fundamental challenges of environmental lawmaking.
Part V argues that the use-conflict framework is an example of how a
neutral baseline, although hazardous as a foundation for a normative
framework, can function effectively as the basis for a descriptive
conceptual framework for law and policy.
I. INADEQUACIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL-HARM FRAMEWORKS
This Part critiques conventional approaches to environmental
law that attempt to organize the field in terms of environmental harm.
It begins by identifying the core factual characteristics of
environmental problems and then explains why a conceptual
framework built around environmental harm fails to reflect those
core characteristics. It then deepens this critique by pointing out
another inadequacy of environmental harm: its submersion of implicit
descriptive and normative baselines.

AAGAARD IN FINAL.DOC

1510

3/30/2011 11:56:23 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1505

A. Environmental Problems
Environmental problems present controversies over the proper
relationship between humans and environmental resources such as
forest lands, watersheds, and the atmosphere. Three distinctive
functional characteristics of environmental resources shape their role
in these controversies: environmental resources are public; they are
7
physical and natural; and they are pervasively interrelated.
As public resources, environmental resources usually are subject
8
to common access and are managed collectively. Both of these
factors exacerbate conflicts. Environmental resources often have
tremendous value for a wide variety of purposes. Open access to such
resources allows large numbers of people to derive many different
benefits from them, both directly and indirectly. Because
environmental resources are common-access resources, their use
tends to raise the difficulty known as the tragedy of the commons, in
which individuals use a resource without internalizing the effect that
their use has on other users and, as a result, use the resource in ways
9
that are not socially optimal. In addition, because environmental
resources are collectively managed, they encounter collective action
10
problems. Additional attributes of environmental resources make
11
them particularly difficult to manage or regulate collectively.
7. See Aagaard, supra note 2, at 264–69.
8. To identify environmental resources as public is not to suggest that environmental law
does not apply to activities that occur on private property. Cf. id. at 264 (“Environmental
problems involve a physical resource that is in important senses publicly rather than privately
valued, owned, and/or controlled.”). Even activities that appear entirely confined to private land
can affect public resources—for example, pavement on a private driveway can increase
stormwater runoff, which contributes to the pollution of public rivers. See, e.g., Robert Pitt,
Richard Field, Melinda Lalor & Michael Brown, Urban Stormwater Toxic Pollutants:
Assessment, Sources, and Treatability, 67 WATER ENV’T RES. 260, 262 (1995) (noting the
contribution of impervious source areas, such as pavement, to stormwater runoff pollution).
9. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968);
see also Aagaard, supra note 2, at 265–66 (discussing the collective action problems that occur
when individuals have unregulated access to public resources).
10. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 50–66 (1982) (discussing the
basic logic of collective action); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (rev. ed. 1971) (explaining the disincentives for
individuals in large groups to act collectively); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6–7 (James E. Alt & Douglass C.
North eds., 1990) (noting the generally recognized difficulties with collective action).
11. See Aagaard, supra note 2, at 267–68 (discussing various characteristics of
environmental resources). For example, environmental resources often have long traditions and
customs of relatively uninhibited exploitation and open access. Cf. Peter Manus, Our
Environmental Rebels: An Average American Law Professor’s Perspective on Environmental
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As physical and natural resources, environmental resources are
subject to limited human control. Human activities affect
environmental resources, but biological, chemical, physical, and other
natural processes play a crucial role in determining the condition of
environmental resources. These natural processes determine in
significant part the relationship between various human interactions
and environmental resources. Natural processes, for example,
determine the dispersal of air pollutant emissions in the atmosphere,
which determines how pollutants affect human health. Humans
generally cannot create new or more environmental resources; they
can only affect the condition of environmental resources—either
intentionally or unintentionally. Environmental resources also are
fundamentally physical, in that the benefits people derive from them
are tied in some way to the physical condition of the resource. A
person may, for example, engage in a recreational activity that
requires or prefers for an environmental resource to be in a particular
physical condition. Or a person may consume a product that, through
its production or use, affects an environmental resource’s physical
condition.
The third core distinctive characteristic of environmental
resources—pervasive
ecological
interconnectedness—creates
complex interrelationships among humans and other constituents of
ecological systems. These interrelationships create interdependencies
among environmental uses, and their complexity can make it very
difficult to determine how one benefit that people derive from an
12
environmental resource is affecting, or could affect, other benefits.
For example, does electricity consumption affect visibility in the
13
Grand Canyon? This complexity poses difficulties for the task of
managing conflicts over environmental resources, as conflicts may not
14
be at all apparent, even after they arise.

Advocacy and the Law, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 518 (2006) (“The American jural system is
based on a fundamental presumption that people bear no moral duties to refrain from
exploiting the environment . . . .”).
12. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 33 (2004) (“[D]ue
to the highly interrelated nature of the ecosystem, it is almost always a mistake to suppose that
one can isolate a single discrete cause as the source of an environmental problem.”).
13. See Mark Crawford, Scientists Battle over Grand Canyon Pollution, 247 SCIENCE 911,
911–12 (1990) (explaining the complexities of determining whether a coal-fired power plant on
the Arizona-Utah border contributes to haze in the Grand Canyon).
14. See infra Part IV.A.
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B. The Environmental-Harm Framework
The concept of environmental harm permeates environmental
law. Environmental law often is described in terms of preventing
15
environmental harm or its converse, protecting the environment.
Only somewhat less generally, many environmental statutes
themselves refer to the protection of human health and the
16
environment. But environmental harm lacks a clear meaning and
tends to collapse a wide variety of environmental effects into a single
undifferentiated category. These characteristics limit environmental
harm’s ability to function as an organizing concept for environmental
law.
1. General Problems. In some circumstances, environmental
harm can be a useful shorthand for the objectives of environmental
law. Environmental law regulates human activities that affect
environmental resources that are part of functioning ecological
systems. Human activities can damage ecological functions and impair
ecosystem health in numerous ways, and people often refer to these
various damages and impairments collectively as environmental
harm. In certain respects, therefore, environmental law’s regulation
of environmental resources can be understood in terms of
environmental harm. Moreover, tools exist by which to evaluate
environmental harm. Science has developed ways of assessing
17
18
ecosystem health, such as biodiversity, ecological integrity, and

15. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
16. Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 459, 460
(1997) (noting that “‘protection of human health and the environment’ appears like a mantra in
virtually every one of our environmental laws” (citing Clean Air Act §§ 108–109, 302(h), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409, 7602(h) (2006); Clean Water Act § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(2)(A) (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 § 121(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 1002, 42
U.S.C. § 6901 (2006); Toxic Substances Control Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2006))).
17. See J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in
Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 542 (2000) (book review) (“Scientific
research suggests that the concept of biological diversity, or biodiversity, is the key metric of
ecosystem health. . . . Biodiversity measures the diversity of species in an ecosystem as an index
of its health.”).
18. See Jeffrey D. Parrish, David P. Braun & Robert S. Unnasch, Are We Conserving What
We Say We Are? Measuring Ecological Integrity Within Protected Areas, 53 BIOSCIENCE 851,
852 (2003) (“[W]e define ecological integrity as the ability of an ecological system to support and
maintain a community of organisms that has species composition, diversity, and functional
organization comparable to those of natural habitats within a region.”).
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19

indicator species. Scientists can measure harm to environmental
resources in terms of these indicators of ecological health—for
20
example, as a reduction in biodiversity.
But when environmental problems get difficult or complicated—
as, given the complex interrelationships among uses of environmental
resources, they so easily and often do—the loose terminology of
environmental harm becomes problematic. In particular, using
environmental harm as an organizing concept conceals two important
aspects of environmental problems and lawmaking: complexity and
normativity.
The environmental-harm framework masks complexity in several
respects. Environmental harms take many different forms, and the
differences among these forms are potentially important to
environmental decisionmaking. Although measures of ecological
health exist, there is no single measure of ecological health and thus
21
no single clear measure of environmental harm. Impacts referred to
as environmental harm or associated with environmental harm occur

19. See Peter B. Landres, Jared Verner & Jack Ward Thomas, Ecological Uses of
Vertebrate Indicator Species: A Critique, 2 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 316, 317 (1988) (“[A]n
indicator species is an organism whose characteristics (e.g., presence or absence, population
density, dispersion, reproductive success) are used as an index of attributes too difficult,
inconvenient, or expensive to measure for other species or environmental conditions of
interest.”); see also S.E. Bunn, P.M. Davies & T.D. Mosisch, Ecosystem Measures of River
Health and Their Response to Riparian and Catchment Degradation, 41 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY
333, 334 (1999) (advocating the use of ecosystem-health measures, such as “the direct
measurement of amounts of organic carbon produced and consumed within the system, and
analysis of the fate of terrestrial and instream sources of organic matter in the aquatic food
web”).
20. See, e.g., Joy B. Zedler, John C. Callaway & Gary Sullivan, Declining Biodiversity: Why
Species Matter and How Their Functions Might Be Restored in Californian Tidal Marshes, 51
BIOSCIENCE 1005, 1005 (2001) (noting that many conservationists and researchers are
“[a]larmed by declining biodiversity”).
21. See, e.g., Bunn et al., supra note 19, at 334 (“Patterns of species distribution and
abundance [i.e., biodiversity measures] are undoubtedly important elements of river health but
often contribute little to an understanding of how a system works, and therefore should not be
the sole consideration.” (citation omitted)); J.E. Hewitt, M.J. Anderson & S.F. Thrush,
Assessing and Monitoring Ecological Community Health in Marine Systems, 15 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 942, 942 (2005) (noting “widespread disagreement as to the[] usefulness” of
existing measures of ecological diversity and contamination); Parrish et al., supra note 18, at 852
(noting the difficulty of finding a measure of biodiversity that is, among other things,
“scientifically defensible” and “practical”); Christopher D. Stone, Land Use and Biodiversity, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 967, 970 (2001) (“[T]here is no single objective measure of biodiversity . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)); Stephen C. Trombulak, Ecological Health and the Northern Forest, 19 VT.
L. REV. 283, 290 (1995) (noting that biodiversity is just one of many indicators of ecological
health and that there are multiple measures of biodiversity).
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in a variety of forms, such as loss of wildlife habitat, water
23
24
pollution, and climate change. An attempt to conceptualize
environmental lawmaking in terms of environmental harm thus
quickly encounters problems. For example, if air pollution and water
pollution both count as environmental harms, how should lawmakers
compare the harm of air pollution to the harm of water pollution?
They often need to make such comparisons because options present
alternatives, many or all of which cause some form of environmental
harm. “Decisionmaking requires trade-offs,” and “[t]rade-offs require
comparative evaluation of competing claims, whether this evaluation
25
is done explicitly . . . or implicitly, by taking a particular decision.”
Merely observing that different options cause divergent
environmental harms does not do much work; lawmakers need a
more particularized way of analyzing environmental effects and
26
choosing among options.
Conceptualizing environmental lawmaking in terms of
environmental protection or environmental harm also obscures the
complexity of the values and interests that are associated with
22. See, e.g., Lenore Fahrig, Relative Effects of Habitat Loss and Fragmentation on
Population Extinction, 61 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 603, 603 (1997) (“Destruction and
fragmentation . . . of natural habitats are the 2 most important factors in the current species
extinction event.” (citation omitted)).
23. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274–91 (2000) (describing various environmental harms resulting from
water pollution).
24. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policy
Makers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 2–18 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf (summarizing recent findings on
climate change).
25. Lynn A. Maguire & James Justus, Why Intrinsic Value Is a Poor Basis for Conservation
Decisions, 58 BIOSCIENCE 910, 910 (2008).
26. One could compare environmental effects by converting different effects to monetary
values, but the monetary reductionism of cost-benefit analysis has been widely criticized on
numerous bases, including its hidden biases. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling,
Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1553, 1584 (2002) (“Cost-benefit analysis cannot overcome its fatal flaw: it is completely reliant
on the impossible attempt to price the priceless values of life, health, nature, and the future.”);
David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 402 (2006)
(concluding that cost-benefit analysis “is not neutral in practice and is, in many ways, antienvironmental in theory”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond CostBenefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 457 (2008) (“The
results of [cost-benefit analysis] are not only inaccurate, they are often biased by the analyst’s
policy preferences or [by] the value judgments that are implicit in rational choice
methodologies.”); see also infra Part III.B.
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environmental law. Environmental resources are subject to varied
27
and numerous uses. The goals of environmental law, accordingly, are
28
not limited to environmental protection. Environmental protection,
moreover, means different things to different people in different
29
situations. In any given scenario, a diverse range of values and
interests may fall under the general category of environmental
protection, including tourism, recreation, wildlife habitat, sustainable
resource extraction, preservation, aesthetic enjoyment, and pollution
prevention. Individuals may care about these different values and
interests to varying degrees. Similarly, decision options may benefit
or disadvantage these values and interests to varying degrees. Each of
these values and interests may have different relationships to various
measures of ecological health in different circumstances. A single
individual, for example, may have one set of concerns with respect to
national parks—say, preserving certain landmarks or flagship
species—and quite different concerns with respect to local
groundwater, which she uses for drinking water. Environmental harm
is a poor proxy for the multitude of diverse and complicated
mechanisms through which people derive benefits from the
environment. Environmental protection is far from monolithic or
unidimensional, and employing the broad categories of
environmental protection or environmental harm obscures
fundamental complexities implicated by the human relationship to
30
environmental resources.
Conceptualizing environmental problems in terms of
environmental harm makes normative judgments in the guise of

27. See supra Part I.A.
28. See John C. Dernbach, Citizen Suits and Sustainability, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 503, 517
(2004) (“We often say that the purpose of environmental law is to protect the environment. But
it is much more complicated than that. To begin with, environmental law has never been aimed
simply at protecting the environment.”); Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial
Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV.
343, 376 n.147 (1989) (“[R]ecent environmental law decisions . . . emphasize that environmental
statutes are compromise measures designed to achieve a variety of goals and that elevating
environmental protection concerns above these other goals is too simplistic.”).
29. See Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 897, 900 (“Harm means different things to different people . . . .”).
30. See John Wiens, Diversity: The Dangers of Black-and-White Conservation, 21
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1371, 1371 (2007) (“The ways in which people relate to a
conservation landscape are many and varied, some with clear economic benefits, some with
quasi-economic benefits, and some that come only through the knowledge that we are
protecting biodiversity because it is there. There are multiple constituencies for conservation,
and to succeed we must aim to be relevant to them all.”).
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factual observations. Whether the environment has been harmed
seems like a purely factual question. But environmental harm
assumes a baseline unharmed environment against which some event
31
or change can be compared. What is an unharmed environment? To
the extent that an unharmed environment is a natural world,
independent of human impacts, such a realm does not exist, for
32
“[t]here really is no such thing as nature untainted by people.” If a
natural world independent of human impact were the baseline, every
human activity would be environmentally harmful merely on the basis
of its association with people. Therefore, because people generally do
not characterize every human activity as environmentally harmful,
they must mean something else by environmental harm.
By characterizing only some human activities as environmentally
harmful—even though all human activities affect the environment in
some way—people implicitly make a judgment, often on the basis of
unspoken criteria, that some human impacts are normatively inferior
33
to others. Thus, labeling something as environmentally harmful is
34
more a statement of disapproval than a factual characterization.
31. See NEIL EVERNDEN, THE SOCIAL CREATION OF NATURE 5–6 (1992) (“In order for
there to be perceptible pollution, there must first be an understanding of systemic order, an
environmental norm.”); John Copeland Nagle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,
46 (2009) (noting that the idea of pollution “presuppose[s] a baseline condition that is
unpolluted”); see also Nagle, supra, at 52, 54–55 (discussing the difficulty of identifying the
baseline unpolluted environment).
32. Peter Kareiva, Sean Watts, Robert McDonald & Tim Boucher, Domesticated Nature:
Shaping Landscapes and Ecosystems for Human Welfare, 316 SCIENCE 1866, 1866 (2007); see
also William Cronon, Introduction: In Search of Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD
REINVENTING NATURE 23, 25 (William Cronon ed., 1995) (“The work of literary scholars,
anthropologists, cultural historians, and critical theorists over the past several decades has
yielded abundant evidence that ‘nature’ is not nearly so natural as it seems.”); Paul J. Crutzen &
Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Anthropocene,” GLOBAL CHANGE NEWSL. (Int’l GeosphereBiosphere Programme, Stockholm, Swed.), May 2000, at 17, 17, available at http://
www.igbp.kva.se/documents/resources/NL_41.pdf (contending that human impacts on the
planet are so extensive that people should “use the term ‘anthropocene’ for the current
geological epoch”).
33. See Lin, supra note 29, at 901 (“‘[H]arm’ is a normative concept that reflects underlying
social judgments about the good and the bad.”); id. at 932 (“[W]hat qualifies as harm rests
largely on societal norms about acceptable behavior.”); Nagle, supra note 31, at 27 (noting that
when the baseline unpolluted state is unclear, the idea of pollution lapses into “connoting moral
defect”); John P. Safranek & Stephen J. Safranek, Can the Right to Autonomy Be Resuscitated
After Glucksberg?, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 745 (1998) (“[W]hat constitutes harm . . . will be
governed by one’s view of the good.”).
34. See Mark Sagoff, Environmental Harm: Political Not Biological, 22 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL.
ETHICS 81, 81 (2009) (“The term ‘environmental harm’ . . . has no meaning in science, policy, or
law.”); id. at 84 (“The term ‘environmental harm’ . . . may possess an aesthetic, religious,
spiritual, historical, cultural, or some other meaning to society; perhaps it can be explicated on
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Because the concept of environmental harm is a descriptively
broad and pliable category with important normative implications,
the term can become a battleground over which effects count in
environmental law and which do not. Thus, for example, in Whitman
35
v. American Trucking Ass’ns, the regulated industry argued that the
36
37
Clean Air Act’s mandate to “protect the public health” should
incorporate consideration of the possibility that a stringent regulatory
standard would economically devastate an industry, impoverishing its
38
workers, who would suffer health losses as a result. The Supreme
39
Court rejected the industry’s argument in that case, and it is easy to
deride the industry’s attempt to characterize profit reductions as a
form of environmental harm. Yet if environmental harm is treated as
a purely descriptive term, without a clear baseline, arguments for an
expansive definition of environmental harm are not as strained as
they first may seem, especially in light of the principle—usually
40
wielded by environmentalists—that everything affects everything. If
nature independent of humans does not exist, and everything affects
these grounds. The concept of ‘environmental harm,’ however, has no referent in biology or in
any other science.”); see also Nagle, supra note 31, at 55 (“[T]he idea of a clean or pure
environment is itself socially constructed.”); Nagle, supra note 31, at 55 (noting that society’s
selection of a baseline unpolluted environmental condition merely reflects “its own preference
for the condition of the environment”).
35. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
36. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
37. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
38. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 466; see also Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537 (8th
Cir. 1975) (citing, as support for a decision not to enjoin environmental violations by the
Reserve Mining Company, the possibility that “ill health effects resulting from the prolonged
unemployment of the head of the family on a closing of the Reserve facility may be more
certain than the harm from drinking Lake Superior water or breathing Silver Bay air”).
39. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 466–68.
40. See, e.g., BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND
TECHNOLOGY 33–39 (1971) (arguing that a change to an ecosystem can have expansive
consequences due to “a simple fact about ecosystems—everything is connected to everything
else”); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem—Coping with the
Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 480–81 n.77 (2002) (“Environmental law’s high
purpose and aspiration is to make sense of the First Law of Ecology, that everything is
connected to everything else.”); see also ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS,
WILLIAM GOLDFARB, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING & DAVID A. WIRTH,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 5 (3d ed. 2004) (“[The
environmental perspective] starts from the premise of interconnectedness—that all human
enterprises exist within one vast shared common context in which actions have collateral
consequences that are relevant and should be considered . . . .”); PLATER ET AL., supra, at xxx
(“As the First Law of Ecology says, everything is connected to everything else.”); PLATER ET
AL., supra, at 5 (“[T]he environmental perspective conceptualizes all human enterprises existing
within one large system of interconnected systems.”).
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everything, then it is not so clear why mercury in the air is an
41
environmental harm, but lack of access to nutritious food is not.
To the extent that environmental protection and environmental
harm are understood as complicated and varied—rather than simple
and unitary—their use may be excusable and even useful. Thus, for
example, Professor Richard Lazarus uses the concept of ecological
injury—a variant of environmental harm—not to treat all
environmental effects monolithically, but instead to highlight certain
common factual characteristics among the various harms that occur
42
through the mechanism of effects on the environment.
Professor Albert Lin’s examination of the role of harm in
environmental law stands as another example of an appropriate and
43
helpful use of environmental harm. Lin argues that harm plays a
44
“[u]nifying [r]ole” in environmental law, in that harm is “a necessary
45
condition for government intervention.” Lin implicitly recognizes,
however, that harm in environmental law, properly understood, is not
harm to the environment but rather harm to a human interest that
46
occurs through effects on the environment. Lin proposes a
theoretical framework for understanding harm in environmental law
that views harm, in its various forms in environmental law, as “a
normative concept that reflects underlying social judgments about the
47
good and the bad.” Lin’s focus thus differs from that of this Article,
but his analysis supports the direction that this Article takes. In
particular, Lin’s focus on harm to human interests in environmental
resources, rather than harm to the resources themselves, corroborates
an approach that views environmental law in terms of conflicts over
uses of environmental resources.

41. Cf. PLATER ET AL., supra note 40, at 5 (noting that when it is applied broadly, “the
term ‘environmental’ may seem uselessly broad, describing nothing in particular”).
42. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 745–48 (2000) (noting that injuries that arise in
environmental law often are irreversible, catastrophic, and continuing; physically and
temporally distant from the actions that cause them; uncertain; resulting from multiple causes;
and nonhuman and noneconomic).
43. See Lin, supra note 29.
44. Id. at 897.
45. Id. at 898.
46. See id. at 926–27 (“[A] working understanding of harm in environmental law should
begin with harm as a setback to a person’s interests.” (footnote omitted)).
47. Id. at 901.

AAGAARD IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/30/2011 11:56:23 AM

USE CONFLICTS

1519
48

Professor Dan Farber’s 1999 book Eco-Pragmatism, on the
other hand, is an example of an environmental-harm framework that
illustrates some of the drawbacks of using environmental harm as an
organizing principle for environmental law. Eco-Pragmatism is a
masterful work that makes compelling arguments in favor of Farber’s
pragmatic approach to environmental lawmaking. Indeed, Eco49
Pragmatism has been very well received by environmental scholars,
50
is widely cited, and was the subject of a tributary symposium in the
51
Minnesota Law Review. Eco-Pragmatism thus stands as an example
of the best of the environmental-harm approaches to environmental
law.
In Eco-Pragmatism, Farber observes that environmental
52
lawmaking involves excruciatingly difficult tradeoffs, creating a
decisionmaking context in which “there is no escaping hard
53
judgments.” He argues that, in making such judgments, a
commitment to “environmental quality” should form the baseline for
54
environmental lawmaking. As to the substance of what it means to
55
protect the environment, however, Farber is not precise. Farber

48. FARBER, supra note 1.
49. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 387
(2002) (praising Eco-Pragmatism as a “tour de force”); see also Amy J. Wildermuth, EcoPragmatism and Ecology: What’s Leopold Got to Do with It?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 1145 n.2
(2003) (“Many have sung the praises of Farber’s eco-pragmatism . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 307 n.81 (2007); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics
and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 256 n.398 (2005);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can
Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1140 n.166 (2005); Douglas A. Kysar, The
Consultants’ Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2048 n.20 (2008) (book review).
51. Symposium, The Pragmatic Ecologist: Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic
Experience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 847 (2003).
52. FARBER, supra note 1, at 1, 94.
53. Id. at 93.
54. E.g., id. at 94; see also id. at 97 (contending that federal environmental law does, and
should, adopt “a presumption in favor of environmental protection”); id. at 103 (contending that
“Congress has adopted a pro-environmental baseline” that “treat[s] environmental risks as
impermissible except when required by considerations of feasibility”); id. at 109 (arguing in
favor of applying “environmental values” to guide lawmaking).
55. See Wildermuth, supra note 49, at 1157 (chiding Farber gently for “talk[ing] vaguely
about a presumption in favor of the environment”). Wildermuth proposes ecological science,
particularly the work of ecologist Aldo Leopold, as a source for “usefully augment[ing] Farber’s
eco-pragmatic framework and its central concept of an environmental baseline.” Id. She draws
on Leopold’s concept of land health, which he intended to reflect “‘the health of the land as a
whole.’” Id. at 1152 (quoting Aldo Leopold, Biotic Land-Use, in FOR THE HEALTH OF THE
LAND 198, 202 (J. Baird Callicott & Eric T. Freyfogle eds., 1999)). Leopold identified soil
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describes the analytical process by which he believes environmental
lawmaking should proceed—“a hybrid of feasibility analysis and cost56
benefit analysis” —but he does not define what counts as
environmental protection. It is unclear how to measure the
environmental quality that forms Farber’s baseline, especially when
decisions involve tradeoffs among different types of pollution or
degradation, or tradeoffs among values that concurrently claim to fall
within the category of environmental protection. In short, Farber’s
environmental baseline raises normative questions—which it does not
answer—about what society wants for the environment. The
relationship between humans and environmental resources, both
actually and aspirationally, is multidimensional and complicated; yet
this is not well reflected in the concept of environmental harm.
Because Eco-Pragmatism is among the best approaches to
environmental law that rely on the concept of environmental harm,
its limitations support a critique of environmental harm more
generally.
2. Problems with Baselines. The hazards of understanding
environmental lawmaking in terms of environmental harm are an
example of the broader recurring problems that baselines cause in law
57
and policy. Baselines can operate factually and normatively, and the
environmental-harm framework raises problems with both types.
fertility and biodiversity as potential measures of land health, though he recognized that no
single measure could capture overall land health. Id. at 1152–53 (citing Leopold, supra, at 202–
05). Ecology, however, cannot overcome the limitations of an environmental-harm approach.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
56. FARBER, supra note 1, at 116.
57. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and
the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 114 n.219
(2001) (noting the importance of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s selection of a
baseline to its decisions whether to relicense an existing hydropower project); Madeline June
Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into Account in Threshold
Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 57–58 (2009) (noting the absence of clear
baselines for determining which environmental impacts qualify as significant under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006)); Julie Thrower,
Comment, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View of Ecosystems
Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 872–73 (2006) (“Recognition of the
constantly changing nature of ecosystems has undermined the foundational assumptions of
NEPA, challenging the notion that we can establish baselines to identify an ‘undisturbed’
ecosystem.”). The problem of baselines, although particularly acute in environmental policy, is
not unique to that arena. Scholars have noted baseline problems in other areas of the law as
well. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest in an Empty Teapot: Why the
Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2008)
(“For people to speak of such gerrymanders as vote diluting, they must have in mind some ideal
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Factual baselines are reference points for factual comparisons.
Confusion arises when factual baselines are unclear, causing
comparisons and claims to become facile and susceptible to
59
manipulation for rhetorical advantage. For example, in 2002, the
George W. Bush administration announced its Clear Skies Initiative
(Clear Skies), a cap-and-trade program for regulating the emissions of
60
three air pollutants: sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury.
The administration and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
characterized Clear Skies as “an aggressive plan to cut power plant
61
pollution by 70 percent.” Critics of the administration, however,
demographic baseline.”); John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost
Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1086 (2005) (“Negative externalities can be distinguished from
positive externalities only by identifying a baseline, and the choice of a baseline is generally
considered arbitrary as a matter of theory.”); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352 (1984) (“[T]he
distinction between liberty-expanding offers and liberty-reducing threats turns on the
establishment of an acceptable baseline against which to measure a person’s position after
imposition of an allocation.”); Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the
Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 150 (2009)
(“[A]cknowledging the fact that the benefits of federal court access are concentrated on
identifiable parties introduces a ‘baseline’ problem to the task of jurisdictional allocation.”);
Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 200 (2007) (“In short, it is necessary to identify
the baseline against which any ‘compensation’ [to future generations] must be paid, and the real
work is being done by that baseline, not by the idea of compensation.”).
58. See Paul Roberts, From Theory into Practice: Introducing the Reference Class Problem,
11 INT’L. J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 243, 245 (2007) (“Every factual generalisation implies a
reference class . . . .”). Professor Edward Cheng has summarized the reference-class problem as
follows: “Inference often involves abstracting a person (or event or thing) to a few salient
characteristics, and then comparing that person [or event or thing] with others having the same
or similar characteristics. But the problem becomes: How does one choose the comparison
group?” Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 2081, 2085 (2009).
59. Difficulties also arise with the unavailability of information to serve as a baseline. See,
e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1435 (2008) (“Another recurring problem
across the landscape of environmental law and policy is the lack of good baseline information
on environmental conditions and stressors.”). In this Article, however, I am focused on
conceptual problems with baselines.
60. Press Release, EPA, Clear Skies Legislation Introduced in Congress Proposal Will
Improve Air Quality, Prevent Premature Deaths, Illnesses (July 29, 2002), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/c1b111b0d87d59
1385256c0500625054.
61. Id.; see also John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and
Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 470 (2008) (“Clear Skies called for a uniform, nationwide
70% reduction in three pollutants (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and mercury).”); Press
Release, EPA, New EPA Data Show Dramatic Air Quality Improvements from Clear
Skies Initiative (July 1, 2002), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/
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asserted that Clear Skies “would increase air pollution” and “would
63
let plants pollute more.” Arguably, both characterizations were
accurate. The initiative was projected to reduce emissions of sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury by at least 70 percent, as
64
compared with emissions in 2000. On the other hand, some analyses
showed that Clear Skies, as compared with continued implementation
and strict enforcement of existing law, would result in greater
65
emissions. Thus, both the Bush administration and its environmental
critics were able to make true, yet conflicting, claims about Clear
Skies’ effect on air pollution—that Clear Skies would both protect the
environment and harm the environment—based on different
underlying, implicit factual baselines. The audience of these
competing claims, moreover, had no way of evaluating their relative
validity. As long as factual baselines are unclear, the bases for the
competing factual claims cannot be assessed, and factual validity
becomes indeterminable.
In other situations, the problem is not an unidentified baseline
but rather alternative outcomes that are incommensurable in terms of
environmental harm. In 2004, for example, the EPA issued
66
regulations pursuant to Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act
requiring power plants to employ certain technologies to protect
67
aquatic organisms from the plants’ cooling-water intake systems.
Environmental groups wanted the EPA to require more stringent
b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/3feaba8793ea23c885256be9005c5e75; Press Release, Nat’l
Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change
Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html.
62. Press Release, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, In Morning Speech, Whitehouse Sharply
Criticizes Political Influence at EPA (May 2, 2008), available at http://whitehouse.senate.gov/
newsroom/speeches/speech/?id=a9de6a3a-8f71-4472-a52a-03e959597e01.
63. Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Clear Skies Would Let Plants Pollute More,
Study Concludes (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/airenergy_
powerplants.asp (follow “Clear Skies would let plants pollute more, study concludes”
hyperlink).
64. Clear Skies: Frequent Questions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/faqs.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2011).
65. See Ken Baumel, Energy Vendors, Environmentalists at Odds over ‘Clear Skies,’ NE.
PA. BUS. J., Oct. 1, 2002, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/environmental-regulations/
1105612-1.html.
66. Clean Water Act § 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006). The Clean Water Act is codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
67. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg.
41,576, 41,605 (July 9, 2004).
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closed-cycle technology that would kill fewer aquatic organisms. The
EPA declined on the ground that the closed-cycle technology would
69
cost too much, given the limited benefits it would generate. Among
other things, the more stringent closed-cycle technology would have
reduced the energy efficiency of power plants, which in turn would
70
have increased air pollution. The options posed a tradeoff of
environmental outcomes—dead aquatic life versus air pollution—that
environmental harm provides no basis for comparing.
Baselines, moreover, are not only problematic due to their lack
of clarity and their susceptibility to manipulation. The deeper
difficulty with baselines is that they insert normativity into putatively
descriptive claims. Baselines operate normatively to the extent that
they compete for a default normative position. “A baseline, in this
context, is a state of affairs that requires no justification, and that
establishes a norm, so that any deviations from the baseline require
71
special justification.” Normative baselines cause confusion insofar as
they entail hidden normative assumptions about the problems at
issue. Take the example of the 2000 Supreme Court case, Friends of
72
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.
Between 1987 and 1995, Laidlaw Environmental Services, which
operated a hazardous waste incinerator in South Carolina, repeatedly
discharged mercury into the North Tyger River in amounts that
73
exceeded the limits in Laidlaw’s Clean Water Act permit. The
permit violations did not result in any demonstrable health risk or
environmental damage—despite the permit exceedance, water quality
in the North Tyger River “exceed[ed] levels necessary to support
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and recreation in and on
74
the water.” Some nearby residents, however, complained that their
concern that Laidlaw’s discharges were polluting the water had

68. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1504 (2009).
69. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 41,601–06.
70. Id. at 41,605.
71. Daniel A. Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, Environmental Law, and Statutory
Interpretation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 678 n.12 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)).
72. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
73. Id. at 175–76.
74. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 602
(D.S.C. 1997), vacated, 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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affected their recreational use of the river. In such a situation, what
counts as harm? Were the river users harmed because they curtailed
their use of the river out of concern about Laidlaw’s mercury
discharges, or must they show damage to the river itself? The issue
was of considerable practical significance to the parties, given that the
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate an injury to have standing to
76
bring their suit.
Take another example: In 2005–06, the National Park Service
eradicated thousands of feral pigs living on Santa Cruz Island in the
77
Channel Islands National Park off the coast of California. The pigs,
descendants of farm animals brought to the island in the 1850s, had
78
proliferated and disrupted the island’s native foxes and plants. The
Park Service hailed the pig eradication program as an important step
79
toward improving the island’s ecosystem. Some citizens’ groups,
80
however, assailed the program as a barbaric slaughter of wildlife.
Thus, both sides seized the mantle of environmental harm to support
their conflicting objectives.
These examples illustrate that, although baselines are often used
in analyses that appear factual and descriptive, the choice of a
baseline has a strong normative aspect. Thus, the Bush administration
compared Clear Skies to existing emissions on the implicit normative
premise that the success of air pollution laws should be measured by
whether they reduce pollution below existing levels. If Clear Skies
would reduce both the economic costs of regulatory compliance and
air pollution, the administration apparently reasoned, then no one
could reasonably oppose it. Environmentalist critics disagreed with
the Bush administration’s use of existing emissions levels as the
baseline for comparison because their goal was to maximize
reductions in air pollution. Therefore, they measured Clear Skies
against other alternatives that decreased emissions even further. The
75. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181–83, 198.
76. Id.
77. Gregory W. Griggs, Island Pig Eradication Completed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at
B3.
78. Id.
79. See Restoring Santa Cruz Island, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/chis/
naturescience/restoring-santa-cruz-island.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) (indicating that the feral
pig program was “the most important action that [could] be taken to protect and restore” the
island).
80. See Santa Cruz Island Pigs, IN DEF. OF ANIMALS WILDLIFE CAMPAIGN, http://
www.idausa.org/campaigns/wildlife/santa_cruz_island_pigs.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011)
(describing the program as a “horrific event”).
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administration’s and environmentalists’ factual claims conflicted
because their underlying normative ideals, each of which supported
its own implicit baseline, differed.
In sum, environmental harm as an analytical tool for
understanding environmental lawmaking is fundamentally flawed.
The environmental-harm framework undeniably has intuitive appeal.
It frames vexing problems simply and accessibly in ways that
correspond to deep normative assumptions about the proper
relationship between humans and environmental resources. No one,
for example, wants to be responsible for harming the environment.
But the very traits that give environmental harm intuitive appeal also
make it tremendously problematic as an organizing principle for
environmental law and as a foundation for discussion among people
with differing viewpoints. Environmental harm incorporates factual
and normative baselines that are implicit, unclear, and contested,
thereby obscuring factual complexity and normativity. The
environmental-harm framework thus undermines possibilities for
thoughtful engagement and deliberation in policymaking and
lawmaking by allowing factual and normative claims to remain
unarticulated and undefended.
II. THE USE-CONFLICT FRAMEWORK
This Part describes the basic elements of the use-conflict
framework and then examines the framework’s key components in
detail. It also illustrates the framework by applying it to the examples
introduced in Part I.
A. Basics of the Framework
An analytical framework for environmental law should focus on
the most salient aspects of environmental problems. Part I argued
that environmental harm fails as an organizing concept for
environmental law because it does not capture the complex
interrelationships between humans and environmental resources and
because it conceals important normative judgments. The use-conflict
framework, however, proceeds from the recognition that people care
about environmental resources insofar as they derive some form of
value from them—for example, by consuming the goods they
produce; by using them directly for various economic, recreational,
social, or spiritual purposes; by appreciating the benefits they confer
on other people and on other species; or by simply appreciating them.
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I refer collectively to all of these means of deriving value from
environmental resources as uses. The use-conflict framework employs
uses as the building blocks—the primary units of analysis—for its
conceptualization of environmental law.
Given that environmental uses reflect human relationships to
environmental resources in their various forms, it follows that
environmental problems arise when people place competing demands
on resources. Demands on an environmental resource compete when
uses conflict with each other, in the sense that desired uses are
associated with differing physical conditions of the resource. The useconflict framework therefore conceptualizes environmental problems
as situations of conflicting uses of environmental resources.
If conflicts among uses define environmental problems, then the
management of use conflicts defines environmental decisionmaking.
The use-conflict framework conceptualizes environmental lawmaking
as the management of conflicts among uses of environmental
resources. Lawmaking institutions faced with a decision affecting a
resource choose among various available options, each of which
carries with it certain advantages and disadvantages regarding the
potential uses of the resource. The selection of an option manages
conflicts among the uses of the resource by regulating those uses.
Thus, use conflicts underlie and shape the lawmaking choice. The
question of how to resolve these conflicts, moreover, implicates
notions of value, for it is values—however defined and from whatever
source—that lead a lawmaker to choose one decision option over
another.
In addition to focusing on the most salient aspects of
environmental problems, a framework for environmental lawmaking
should reflect the fundamental characteristics of environmental
problems, which are common and distinctive to environmental law:
environmental resources are public; they are physical and natural;
81
and they are pervasively interrelated. The use-conflict framework
posits that environmental problems are, at their core, conflicts over
the management of resources that arise when potential uses of those
resources conflict, and that the characteristics of resources tend to
81. See supra Part I.A. If there were no such distinctive characteristics, then there would be
no reason to construct a framework specific to environmental law. See generally Aagaard, supra
note 2, at 244 (“For a legal field to be legitimate, there must be a good reason to focus on that
particular category; that is, there must be some reason not to look at some broader set of
materials. Distinctiveness—the idea that some features of a field are distinct to that field and
not present in other fields—provides just such a justification.”).
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give rise to conflicts that are intense, complicated, and
multidimensional. The use-conflict framework thus properly
conceptualizes the human relationship to the environment as a
complex web of pervasively interrelated uses of environmental
resources that defies reduction into oversimplified categories, such as
environmental harm.
The use-conflict framework is a conceptual framework—a way of
organizing thinking about environmental problems and lawmaking. It
is not a decision model or method. It does not predict or endorse
particular policy positions or decision outcomes. It does, however,
provide an intellectual structure for facilitating thoughtful analysis
and debate about environmental law issues in whatever context they
arise.
B. Uses
To understand the use-conflict framework’s contention that
environmental law is fundamentally about conflicts among uses of
environmental resources requires a clear understanding of what a use
means in this context. This Section defines use, emphasizing that its
breadth encompasses the broad scope of all benefits—economic, but
also psychological and spiritual, material and immaterial, direct and
indirect—that people derive from environmental resources. It
explains how commonalities between the use-conflict framework and
the concept of ecosystem services—a leading existing approach to
analyzing environmental benefits—support the use-conflict
framework. In particular, the use-conflict framework incorporates the
insights of ecosystem-services analyses into a descriptive, conceptual
framework of environmental decisionmaking.
An environmental use, as the use-conflict framework employs
the term, is any means by which people derive value from an
environmental resource. Thus, breathing air, grazing cattle in a
meadow, taking water from a river for irrigation, emitting air
pollutants while driving a car, canoeing on a lake, admiring a stream,
or even appreciating the existence of a stream without seeing it or
taking anything physical from it, are all examples of uses of
environmental resources.
Such an expansive definition of an environmental use may
conflict in some ways with an intuitive sense of what the term use
should encompass. One might question how appreciating the
existence of a stream is a use, when that appreciation does not involve
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one’s physical presence at the stream or taking anything physical from
the stream, either directly or indirectly. That is, use may seem to have
an inherent physical component that is missing from the mere
82
appreciation of the existence of an environmental resource.
The use-conflict framework’s broad definition of use does not,
however, unmoor the term from physicality. Uses of environmental
resources invariably are tied to the physical state of the resource,
regardless of whether the person deriving the benefit has any physical
involvement with or presence at the resource. For some uses, the link
is the physical condition of the environmental resource that is
necessary, or preferable, to support the use. For example, a river is a
better source of drinking water if it is relatively free of contaminants.
An area of wilderness backcountry may be appreciated, even by
people who never see it or visit it, because it is relatively undisturbed
by human activity. For other uses, the relationship may run in the
opposite direction, meaning that no particular physical condition is
required to support the use, but that the use changes the physical
condition of the resource. A car generally does not require clean air
83
to operate, but the car’s emissions increase the amount of certain

82. But see WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1299 (1984) (“USE implies
availing oneself of something as a means or instrument to an end.”). Perhaps reflecting this
intuition, some scholars have drawn distinctions between the different means by which people
derive value from an environmental resource. Some distinguish use value from nonuse value.
E.g., Michael Lockwood, Integration of Natural Area Values: Conceptual Foundations and
Methodological Approaches, 12 AUSTRALASIAN J. ENVTL. MGMT. 8, 11 (2005); Thomas A.
More, James R. Averill & Thomas H. Stevens, Values and Economics in Environmental
Management: A Perspective and Critique, 48 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 397, 398 (1996). Some further
classify use value into current use value, option value, and quasi-option value. E.g., Alan Randall
& John R. Stoll, Existence Value in a Total Valuation Framework, in MANAGING AIR QUALITY
AND SCENIC RESOURCES AT NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDERNESS AREAS 265, 267 (Robert D.
Rowe & Lauraine G. Chestnut eds., 1983). Similarly, the category of nonuse value has been
subdivided further into existence value, altruistic value, and bequest value. E.g., More et al.,
supra, at 398; see also Lockwood, supra, at 11 (identifying existence value and bequest value as
the subcategories of nonuse value, but omitting the category of altruistic value).
Although these classifications help illustrate the various means by which people derive
value from the environment and can be useful differentiations for other purposes, ultimately
they offer little analytical value to the understanding of environmental decisionmaking or
conflicts over environmental resources. Distinctions among benefits do not necessarily bear any
relationship to the magnitude or importance of the value or benefit derived. For example, a
person may derive much more benefit from the comfort she takes in the existence of Yosemite
National Park (a nonuse value) than from the local stream in which she occasionally fishes (a
use value).
83. But see Ross Anderson, Mount St. Helens Remembered: ‘God is speaking,’ SEATTLE
TIMES, May 14, 2000, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/special/helens/story1.html (noting that
ash from the eruption of Mount St. Helens in 1980 clogged auto engine air filters); The Plain
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pollutants in the air. Finally, some uses both affect and are affected by
the physical condition of the resource. A meadow better supports
grazing if it contains ample vegetation; in addition, using the meadow
for grazing will affect the condition of the meadow. Any value
derived from an environmental resource reflects the resource’s
physical characteristics in some sense. This physicality unites
environmental uses, plays a critical role in determining various uses
and the relationships among them, and is an important element of
84
what makes environmental law distinctive.
One also could object that the term use connotes an economic or
even extractive orientation toward environmental resources and
thereby marginalizes other environmental benefits associated with
scientific, cultural, psychological, or spiritual values. Such an
objection would be misplaced. An environmental use requires human
85
appreciation to be relevant to human decisionmaking. Use therefore
English Guide to the Clean Air Act, EPA, http://epa.gov/air/caa/peg/understand.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2011) (noting that during London’s “killer fog” of 1952, “[t]he smog was so thick
that buses could not run without guides walking ahead of them carrying lanterns”).
84. Aagaard, supra note 2, at 264–68.
85. The nature of environmental problems is such that some authors who present
normative perspectives on environmental problems perceive themselves as being in conflict
with, or at least in contradistinction to, anthropocentrism. Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 35–
36 (2004) (discussing the relationship and distinctions among intrinsic value, deontological
value, and anthropocentric value). The use-conflict framework’s relationship to
anthropocentrism thus bears comment. The use-conflict framework is anthropocentric, but only
to the extent that all lawmaking processes must be. That is, humans decide the content of law, so
a value is reflected in the law only to the extent that a human participant in the lawmaking
process is persuaded to act upon the value. Donald J. Boudreaux & Roger E. Meiners, Existence
Value and Other of Life’s Ills, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 153, 181 n.2 (Peter J. Hill &
Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998) (“Of course, if natural resources ‘have value independent of
human beings,’ humans must acknowledge that value if there is to be any recognition of such
value . . . .”); Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 296
(1989) (“Enlightened human preference thus may capture at least a portion of intrinsic value,
but the preference is predicated necessarily on an informed human understanding of intrinsic
value, not on the value itself.”).
The content of the human values represented in environmental lawmaking is, however,
not necessarily anthropocentric, and the use-conflict framework recognizes that uses are not
limited to material benefits that flow directly from environmental resources to humans. People
often derive benefits from the environment through an appreciation that is separate from any
direct material benefit to themselves. They may appreciate that other humans now or in future
generations will breathe clean air, that wildlife and plants benefit from clean air, or even the
mere existence of clean air now or in the future. All of these indirectly derived benefits (as well
as the more direct benefits) qualify as uses under the use-conflict framework by virtue of the
benefits people derive from them. People’s appreciation of these benefits reflects the values
they hold, be they anthropocentric or not. Thus, the process of environmental lawmaking—
which is the focus of the use-conflict framework—necessarily is anthropocentric, even if the
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appropriately suggests a requisite link between the physical condition
of the environmental resources and some level of human appreciation
of a benefit deriving from that physical condition. Beyond that
important but limited sense, however, use in the use-conflict
86
framework does not favor any particular orientation or viewpoint.
Indeed, federal natural-resource planning statutes employ use in just
such an expansive sense, making clear that the term includes the
87
benefits of, for example, preservation.
The use-conflict framework focuses directly on environmental
uses because uses drive human decisionmaking about such resources.
Although there is some intrinsic appreciation of environmental
resources, the value people attach to them is overwhelmingly
instrumental. The physical condition of a resource is a necessary or
preferred condition for something else that is valued directly: the use.
A person’s preference for a particular physical condition of the
resource is derivative of, or incidental to, the person’s use of the
resource. Take the example of a river. Although some may appreciate
the river intrinsically for its ecological health, most do not. Most
benefits the river provides—source of drinking water, recreational
site, conveyance of stormwater runoff, or receptacle for pollution—
are only related to ecological health to varying extents and in varying
ways.
Even users whose benefit depends on the aesthetic appreciation
of an environmental resource are not directly valuing the ecological
health of the resource. Almost every benefit that an environmental
resource generates is mediated by an intervening activity that

substance of environmental law need not be. See Kelly A. Parker, Pragmatism and
Environmental Thought, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM 21, 33 (Andrew Light & Eric Katz
eds., 1996) (“[H]uman experience, the human perspective on value, is the only thing we know as
humans.”); Ruhl, supra note 17, at 532 (“[A]ll environmental values—or all the environmental
values that count—are those that derive from the human experience, about which humans
converse, and which only humans measure.”); Valentí Rull, The Candid Approach, 11 EMBO
REP. 14, 16 (2010) (“In the end, all the reasons . . . for preserving biodiversity, whether
commercial, sustainable, moral, ethical, or candid, are still anthropocentric because humans
assess the value of nature on the basis of their material and cultural needs.”).
86. The use-conflict framework includes, for example, so-called existence value, which is
often distinguished from more anthropocentric values that are more readily associated with the
idea of a use. Cf. supra note 82.
87. See, e.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2006) (“The
establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with [the statute’s
principles of multiple use and sustained yield].”); Federal Land Policy and Management Act
§ 103(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2006) (defining “multiple use” to include “natural scenic, scientific
and historical values”).
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complicates the benefit, so that its appreciation is not merely an
appreciation of the resource’s ecological health. A canoeist who
enjoys canoeing a river may care about certain physical attributes of
the river—whether it supports aquatic life, whether it emits a noxious
odor—but this does not equate to a direct concern about the river’s
ecological health. Indeed, even users who consider themselves
environmentalists may enjoy non-native plant and animal species or
prefer to hike in an area cleared of native mountain lions or
rattlesnakes. Yet in those situations in which users or decisionmakers
value the ecological health of the resource more intrinsically, it still
makes sense to analyze in terms of uses because doing so provides a
common frame through which to analyze the competing demands on
environmental resources. Indeed, even people who value ecological
health directly, independent of human benefit, usually associate their
preference for ecological health with certain patterns of human use or
nonuse.
The concept of ecosystem services highlights the range of
benefits from environmental resources that constitute a use for
purposes of the use-conflict framework. Ecosystem services describes
88
“the contributions that ecosystems make to human well-being.” The
idea of ecosystem services serves as a vehicle for expanding our
understanding of the benefits that people derive from ecosystems by
pointing to underappreciated but valuable aspects of natural systems,
such as the contribution of pollinating insects to agricultural crop
89
production.

88. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Services & Natural Capital: Reconceiving
Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 460, 464 (2008); see also Thomas C. Brown,
John C. Bergstron & John B. Loomis, Defining, Valuing, and Providing Ecosystem Goods and
Services, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329, 334 (2007) (“We define ecosystem goods and services
generally as the flows from an ecosystem that are of relatively immediate benefit to humans and
occur naturally.”); Brown et al., supra, at 334 n.12 (defining “naturally occurring goods and
services” as “those that exist without human action”); Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What
Are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL
ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (“Ecosystem services are the conditions and
processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and
fulfill human life.”); Brendan Fisher, R. Kerry Turner & Paul Morling, Defining and Classifying
Ecosystem Services for Decision Making, 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 643, 645 (2009) (“[E]cosystem
services are the aspects of ecosystems utilized (actively or passively) to produce human wellbeing. The key points are that 1) services must be ecological phenomena and 2) that they do not
have to be directly utilized.” (emphasis omitted)).
89. Thompson, supra note 88, at 460, 466; see also Thomas Dietz, Amy Fitzgerald & Rachel
Shwom, Environmental Values, 30 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 335, 339 (2005) (“The goods
and services that flow from ecosystem functions are often taken for granted.”).
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Ecosystem services may benefit people either indirectly—as
inputs in the production of other goods and services that more
90
directly improve well-being—or directly. Discussions of ecosystem
services tend to focus on material goods and services, such as
91
pollination or water purification. But ecosystem services encompass
92
nonphysical benefits as well. After all, ecosystem services measure
contributions to well-being, and an immaterial or nonconsumptive
benefit from an ecosystem, such as appreciation of a prairie, is not
necessarily any less of a contribution to well-being than a material
benefit, such as a habitat for animals that people like to hunt. Any
attribute of an ecosystem that people value, either directly or
indirectly, is an ecosystem service.
The definition of ecosystem services thus essentially matches the
use-conflict framework’s definition of a use—that is, the means by
which people derive value from the environment. Attempts by
ecosystems-services analyses to catalog the full range of benefits that
people derive from environmental resources can help to illustrate and
inform the range of uses considered under the use-conflict
93
framework.
The concept of ecosystem services carries the implication that
environmental decisionmaking should consider the effects of decision
options on the streams of benefits derived from environmental
resources—that is, ecosystem services. The use-conflict framework
takes this idea further, positing that environmental decisions are best
viewed as choices among options, each of which is associated with one

90. Brown et al., supra note 88, at 338. “[This] dichotomy between ecosystem goods and
services of direct versus indirect utility is somewhat artificial in that there is a continuum from
those ecosystem goods and services that require little or no other inputs to be of direct utility to
humans to those that require a great deal.” Id. at 338 n.20.
91. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services,
22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 157–58 (2007) (listing “purifying air and water, detoxifying
and decomposing waste, renewing soil fertility, regulating climate, mitigating droughts and
floods, controlling pests, and pollinating vegetation” as examples of ecosystem services); James
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870,
882 (2005) (listing “water purification and pollination” as examples of ecosystem services).
92. See Brown et al., supra note 88, at 333 (identifying aesthetics as an ecosystem good);
Daily, supra note 88, at 3 (noting that ecosystem services “confer many intangible aesthetic and
cultural benefits”); Fisher et al., supra note 88, at 645 (defining ecosystem services to include
aspects of ecosystems that are used “actively or passively”); Thompson, supra note 88, at 465
(identifying intangible contributions to human well-being as a form of ecosystem service).
93. See, e.g., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELLBEING: SYNTHESIS (2005) (explaining the health benefits that ecosystems provide to human
populations).
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or more possible streams of benefits. Tradeoffs between conflicting
uses shape the options available to lawmakers and, therefore, are an
important animating force in environmental decisionmaking.
C. Use Conflicts
This fuller understanding of the concept of environmental uses
within the use-conflict framework provides a foundation for exploring
how environmental problems arise from conflicts among
environmental uses. Uses conflict when they interfere with each
other. This interference can arise from either or both of two
circumstances. First, uses may require different physical conditions of
an environmental resource. For example, some people may enjoy an
area more if it has developed tourist accommodations, while others
may enjoy it more if it is left undeveloped. Second, uses may affect—
at least at some intensity of use—the physical character of the
resource in ways that are detrimental to other uses of the resource.
Thus, off-road vehicle use may change the physical character of an
area so that it is less conducive to bird watching. A use may even
conflict with itself, insofar as it leads to physical conditions that are
detrimental to the continuing use of the resource—for example,
fishing in a body of water may reduce its attractiveness for future
fishing.
These are simple examples of bilateral conflicts, but actual
patterns of use conflicts often are much more complex, involving a
web of interrelationships among numerous uses. Of the many and
varied uses of an environmental resource, some may interfere with
each other inherently; some may interfere with each other only at
certain levels or types of use; and some may be entirely compatible.
Allowing surface mining in an area may preclude its use altogether
for all-terrain vehicles and hiking, and vice versa, but all-terrain
vehicle use and hiking may conflict with each other to some extent as
well. And all three uses—surface mining, all-terrain vehicle use, and
hiking—may conflict with the area’s quality as a wildlife habitat, even
if none of them renders the area entirely unfit for wildlife.
Use conflicts arise because most uses of environmental resources
are not what economists call a pure public good. A pure public good
means any number of simultaneous users may use the resource

A
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cataracts—without interfering with anyone else’s similar benefit.
Nothing about one person’s use of the stratospheric ozone layer to
absorb ultraviolet radiation changes the ability of the ozone layer to
protect anyone else. But the range of uses of environmental resources
is such that even when there is not congestion among similar uses,
there is potential congestion across differing uses of the resource.
Thus, for example, interference among uses of the stratospheric
ozone layer arises to the extent that people want to engage in other
categories of use of the resource, such as using chemicals that deplete
the ozone layer, thereby affecting the ozone layer’s ability to absorb
ultraviolet radiation.
Uses that interfere with each other thus result in rivalry and
congestion, which can lead to use conflicts. Uses that do not interfere
with each other—that is, uses that prefer the same physical conditions
and that affect the physical condition of the resource in ways that are
98
not detrimental to each other—are jointly derived and nonrival. For
example, the same physical attributes of a wetland that make it
valuable for removing pollutants from water also may control
99
stormwater flows, reducing flooding. These jointly produced benefits
create use synergies rather than use conflicts.
D. Managing Use Conflicts
If the use-conflict framework is correct in postulating that
environmental problems are fundamentally use conflicts, then it
follows that environmental lawmaking functions to manage use
conflicts. The compatibility and incompatibility of uses define the
options available to lawmakers to resolve use conflicts. Compatible
uses may fall within the same decision option because there is no
inherent tradeoff among compatible uses. Incompatible uses,
however,
necessarily
differentiate
options
because
their
incompatibilities create tradeoffs. Options to manage an
environmental resource variously advantage and disadvantage
potential uses.
As an illustration, consider a meadow. Grazing cattle in the
meadow reduces the quality of the meadow as a habitat for native
wildlife and plants, affecting hunting, wildlife viewing, and other uses

98. See Fisher et al., supra note 88, at 648 (discussing how “ecosystem services can provide
multiple benefits for human welfare”).
99. Id. at 649.
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100

that benefit from native wildlife or plants. Grazing’s effects on other
uses of the meadow create use conflicts, and decisions about how to
manage the meadow advantage some uses and disadvantage others.
Closing the meadow to cattle grazing, for example, advantages
hunting and bird watching. Hunting and bird watching may have their
own interferences with each other, however, and those interferences
raise another management issue. Collectively, decisions about how to
manage the meadow create a set of advantages and disadvantages
that set the parameters for uses of the meadow. To the extent that
those parameters do not dictate a particular balance among potential
uses, it is up to nonlegal mechanisms—such as competition among
users or sorting through social norms—to establish a balance among
uses.
To say that environmental law manages use conflicts does not
mean that it waits until uses of environmental resources are extant
and in actual conflict before regulating. For decisionmaking purposes,
the conflict occurs by virtue of the likelihood that potential uses, if
they came into being, would conflict. It may take an actual conflict
among uses to spur lawmakers to regulate, or lawmakers may take
action in anticipation of a conflict. Sometimes environmental
regulation may avoid an actual conflict altogether by regulating to
prevent conflicts among uses before they arise. For the most part,
however, environmental regulation allows some level of each
conflicting use, and each use thereby incurs some impairment from its
conflicting uses. This does not necessarily represent an inadequacy of
environmental law but rather simply a balancing of conflicting uses.
The Clean Air Act, for example, regulates air emissions so that use of
the atmosphere for breathing and as a waste sink are both allowed
101
and, at the same time, limited somewhat. Breathing is limited by the
presence of pollutants in the air that pose a health risk, and emissions
are limited by regulation.
Given the difficulty in ascertaining a conflict over environmental
uses, questions may arise as to whether uses are actually in conflict. If
a factory is discharging into a river a substance that its operators
believe is benign, but which some members of the public who get
their drinking water from the river believe causes cancer, are the

100. It may be, however, that only the hiker perceives the conflict. The rancher who grazes
cattle in the meadow does not perceive a conflict with the hiker—unless the hiker bothers the
cattle or tries to prevent the rancher from grazing the cattle in the meadow.
101. See infra note 112.

AAGAARD IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/30/2011 11:56:23 AM

USE CONFLICTS

1537

factory’s discharges into the river an appropriate object of
environmental regulation? There may be scientific uncertainty about
the health effects of the substance, in which case there are normative
questions to be answered about how much evidence should be
required to prove or disprove a causal link and who should bear the
burden of proof. But at some point, the perception of a conflict (or
lack thereof) may persist, even though the facts unequivocally
indicate otherwise. The public may continue to fear the factory’s
discharges, even if evidence overwhelmingly shows no basis for
concern. Whether to treat such perceived conflicts as actual conflicts
102
worth managing is, again, an important normative question. The
use-conflict framework thus highlights, but does not itself resolve,
important normative questions about what counts as a conflict worth
managing.
E. Illustrations
This Section illustrates the use-conflict framework by returning
to the example cases from Part I, in which the concept of
103
environmental harm left many important questions unanswered.
Applying the use-conflict framework to these examples shows how
the use-conflict framework provides a superior analytical vantage
point by which to understand environmental law.
104
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. —the power plant cooling
water intake systems case—illustrates a quandary in which all
105
available options involve some form of environmental harm. An
environmental-harm framework is not very helpful in such situations
because the concept of environmental harm does not provide a tool
for comparing the tradeoffs among different harms. A use-conflict
framework, by contrast, identifies the tradeoffs among decision
options in terms of the impacts on uses of environmental resources.
Lawmakers faced a choice between open-cycle cooling water systems

102. See, e.g., Robert A. Pollak, Imagined Risks and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 376, 377 (1998) (explaining the differences in perception between the public and experts);
Paul R. Portney, Trouble in Happyville, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 131, 131 (1992)
(presenting a hypothetical problem about water quality and the differences in the perception of
risk).
103. See supra Part I.B.2.
104. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
105. To say that all available options involve environmental harms is not to equate their
environmental effects but rather to highlight the need for a framework that can differentiate
among environmental effects in ways that reflect differences that matter to people’s decisions.
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with their consequences, including greater damage to aquatic life, and
closed-cycle cooling water systems with their consequences, including
increased air pollution. In the specific context of a particular decision,
the lawmaking institution may have relatively free rein to address
tradeoffs, or it may have its discretion constrained. In Entergy, for
example, the issue before the Supreme Court was what normative
judgments Congress had codified into the Clean Water Act to
constrain the EPA’s discretion in resolving the tradeoffs between the
106
two control technologies.
The debate over Clear Skies illustrates how descriptions of
environmental issues in terms of environmental harm and
environmental protection can mask ambiguous underlying baselines.
Environmental harm and environmental protection both make
comparative claims without a clear baseline—harmful as compared to
what, or protective as compared to what? Analyzing Clear Skies in
terms of use conflicts, on the other hand, facilitates the direct
comparison of the various alternatives by focusing on the
consequences each alternative would have for environmental uses.
How will each option affect the industries that emit regulated
pollutants into the air? How will each option affect the public health
through air pollution? A use-conflict framework compares policy
options to each other in terms of their relevant consequences, instead
of comparing them to an implicit and ambiguous baseline. Making
such comparisons hones in on specific factual issues that, although
potentially clouded by scientific uncertainty, bypass the conceptual
ambiguity of an environmental-harm approach.
Laidlaw—the mercury water-pollution case—presents a prime
example of a situation in which the concept of environmental harm
obscures more than it reveals. Recall that, although Laidlaw’s permit
violations did not result in any demonstrable health risk or
environmental damage, nearby residents complained that their
concerns about Laidlaw’s discharges led them to curtail their
107
recreational use of the river. Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent latched
onto the absence of “demonstrable harm to the environment” to
argue that the plaintiffs lacked an injury that would give them

106. Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1505.
107. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–83
(2000); id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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108

standing to sue. The majority, however, held that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated an injury because they changed their recreational,
aesthetic, and economic uses of the North Tyger River based on their
“reasonable” concern about the effects of Laidlaw’s discharges on the
109
water quality of the river. The majority thus correctly understood
that, conceptually, environmental resources like the North Tyger
River function as a medium that creates relationships among a variety
of human activities by virtue of the activities’ mutual dependence on,
or effects on, environmental resources. The majority’s focus on the
plaintiffs’ uses of the North Tyger River, rather than on harm to the
river, properly centered the inquiry on the link between the plaintiffs’
claimed use impairment and the defendant’s conduct—that is, the link
between the plaintiffs’ reduced enjoyment of the river and Laidlaw’s
discharges. Because the plaintiffs’ reduced enjoyment resulted from a
reasonable concern about the effects of Laidlaw’s discharges, the
110
plaintiffs had standing to sue Laidlaw.
The Santa Cruz Island feral pigs dispute exemplifies a situation
in which both sides of a debate claimed to be seeking to alleviate
environmental harm—the National Park Service, by eradicating feral
pigs; the Park Service’s critics, by preventing what they considered to
111
be a barbaric slaughter of wildlife.
The environmental-harm
framework would ask which harms qualify as environmental, setting

108. See id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To be fair to Justice Scalia, he did acknowledge
that harm to the plaintiffs, and not harm to the environment, was the ultimate focus of the
standing analysis. See id. at 199. To some extent, then—although he did not articulate it as
such—Justice Scalia’s disagreement with the majority seems based on a judgment that the
plaintiffs’ concerns about Laidlaw’s mercury discharges were unreasonable, and therefore that
the plaintiffs’ decisions to change their use of the North Tyger River lacked a causal nexus to
Laidlaw’s mercury discharges. On the other hand, however, Justice Scalia rejected the plaintiffs’
standing allegations on the ground that “[o]ngoing ‘concerns’ about the environment” were akin
to a mere “threat” of injury and did not suffice to constitute an Article III injury, id., a point
that focuses on environmental harm and seems to ignore the plaintiffs’ allegations that their
concerns led them to change their actual use of the river.
109. Id. at 183 (majority opinion).
110. This is not to say that the use-conflict framework would have required a finding that
the plaintiffs had standing. A court might have concluded, consistent with the framework, that
the plaintiffs’ concern over Laidlaw’s discharges was unreasonable and that their impaired use
of the river therefore lacked a sufficient causal link to Laidlaw’s violations. Cf. supra note 108.
111. Compare Griggs, supra note 77 (noting that the National Park Service “considered [the
pigs] a threat to the endangered island fox and nine rare plants”), and Restoring Santa Cruz
Island, supra note 79 (describing how eradication could lead to the island’s “tremendous natural
recovery”), with Santa Cruz Island Pigs, supra note 80 (characterizing the plan as an “atrocity”
and questioning “how killing thousands of wild pigs and leaving their carcasses to rot was going
to help anything”).
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up a contest between competing implicit baselines, each with its own
hidden normative agenda. The use-conflict framework, however,
focuses directly on the conflict between uses of the island, forcing
each side to make a case for the normative superiority of its preferred
use—that is, to argue why the island without feral pigs is better than
the island with pigs, or vice versa.
These four examples demonstrate how the use-conflict
framework yields a better understanding of environmental disputes
than does an environmental-harm approach. The use-conflict
framework, by focusing on human relationships to environmental
uses, illuminates important aspects of environmental controversies
that an environmental-harm approach misses by focusing on
environmental resources themselves.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE USE-CONFLICT FRAMEWORK
The use-conflict framework is a way of conceptualizing
environmental lawmaking. It is not a decision method, nor does it
require a specific method of analysis. As the examples in the previous
Section suggest, however, the framework has concrete implications
for practical environmental lawmaking and environmental policy
analysis. This Part explores those implications.
A. Structure of Environmental Lawmaking
Although the use-conflict framework is not a decision method,
the framework does suggest that certain inquiries should play a major
role in environmental lawmaking. Most importantly, environmental
lawmaking should focus on identifying and resolving conflicts among
environmental uses.
Environmental law manages conflicting uses of environmental
resources in a variety of ways. Environmental laws sometimes
manage uses directly—for example, a limit on the amount of a
contaminant that a source can discharge into a waterway or a limit on
the number of snowmobiles that can enter a national park each
winter day. Or environmental laws may manage uses indirectly,
through effects that eventually advantage or disadvantage a use—for
example, by allowing construction of a new source of air pollution
emissions that will increase the amount of ambient air pollution,
thereby increasing the risk of asthma for those who breathe the
polluted air. Either way, environmental laws are managing conflicts
over uses of environmental resources.
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In an ideal world, lawmakers could manage environmental
resources comprehensively by identifying all potential uses,
recognizing conflicts that may arise among such uses, deliberating
about the values that should be applied to resolve those conflicts, and
then applying those values to regulate environmental uses. But such
comprehensive decisionmaking is well beyond the capabilities of
individuals or institutions, especially considering the scale and
complexity usually encountered in environmental problems. Thus,
deliberate, comprehensive management of environmental resources is
112
seldom, if ever, practical. Environmental lawmaking is piecemeal.
But the reality of segmented lawmaking should not obscure the
underlying truth that individual environmental-lawmaking decisions
combine to collectively manage environmental resources. Participants
in individual environmental decisions can ask how well their decision
structures and processes reflect this truth, and, whenever possible,
they should consider how a decision about an environmental resource
interacts with other decisions that regulate uses of the resource.
Keeping in mind this larger decision context should improve the
112. As a step in this process of segmented decisionmaking, environmental lawmakers often
make decisions in terms of environmental-quality indicators. For example, the Clean Air Act
directs the EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for air
pollutants; states must then develop implementation plans that will limit air pollution to levels
below the standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7410 (2006). One could interpret environmental
law’s reliance on environmental quality indicators as supporting an environmental-harm
framework. Arguably, environmental quality indicators reflect a focus on environmental
quality, rather than environmental uses. But almost no one cares directly about environmentalquality indicators. Rather, lawmakers choose a particular environmental-quality standard as a
rough proxy for facilitating certain uses that are preferred and consistent with the standard.
NAAQS, for example, are set at levels that are thought to prevent particular health effects from
air pollution. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,964
(Nov. 12, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 53, 58) (noting that the EPA made the
NAAQS for lead more stringent to reduce the incidence of adverse neurological,
cardiovascular, immunological, and other health impacts in children). Lawmakers choose to
regulate an air pollutant at a certain level because that level allows some balancing of uses.
Even when an environmental-quality standard appears to reflect a single use, it inevitably
strikes a balance among uses in some respect. The NAAQS, for example, although set at levels
“requisite to protect the public health” and “requisite to protect the public welfare” from the
adverse effects of air pollution, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b), are not set at levels that make air
completely healthy to breathe, see, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73
Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,478 (Mar. 27, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58) (noting “evidence
that some healthy individuals will experience lung function decrements and respiratory
symptoms” even at levels below the NAAQS for ozone). Moreover, Congress has delayed
deadlines for attaining compliance with the NAAQS for areas in which states are having great
difficulty in reducing air pollution by sufficient magnitudes to meet the standards. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 7511 (classifying states and assigning dates for compliance based on the severity of air
pollution).
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responsiveness of environmental law to the values of the people
whom lawmakers represent.
At bottom, a use-conflict framework for environmental
lawmaking points toward two central sets of inquiries that should
undergird efforts to improve the governance of environmental
resources. The first inquiry is empirical and examines the relationship
among the various possible uses of an environmental resource. How
do these uses affect each other, creating conflicts and synergies that
will shape the options available to lawmakers? The second inquiry is
normative and asks how lawmakers should choose among uses when
there are tradeoffs. What uses and what users of an environmental
resource count for purposes of environmental law? In navigating
tradeoffs among uses, how much weight should lawmakers accord to
different uses?
These questions can never be answered definitively. As to the
first inquiry, human understanding of the complex ecological
processes that create relationships among uses will always be
113
incomplete. Indeed, it may be difficult enough to understand the
many, varied uses of environmental resources—which often are not
reflected in politics or markets—let alone the relationships among
uses. As to the second inquiry, normative disagreement manifests the
diversity of human values and is therefore unavoidable. The results of
these inquiries thus will always be uncertain and indeterminate—but
not unhelpful. Inquiring into the empirical and normative
relationships among environmental uses, as the use-conflict
framework does, at least focuses on the crux of environmental
problems.
B. Relationship to Analytical Methods
Because the use-conflict framework does not prescribe a specific
method of analysis or decision, it is not an alternative to particular
analytical methods, such as cost-benefit analysis. The framework is,
however, more compatible with some types of analytical methods
than others. It works best with methods that share its core
advantageous traits: highlighting the tradeoffs among policy options,
reflecting the multidimensionality and complexity of environmental

113. See Lazarus, supra note 42, at 747 (noting that “the sheer complexity of the natural
environment” causes uncertainty about how human actions affect environmental resources).
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problems, and encouraging or forcing explicit discussion of normative
judgments.
Of the various analytical methods, cost-benefit analysis
114
dominates regulatory debates. Cost-benefit analysis appears, at first
glance, similar to a use-conflict framework. Cost-benefit analysis
involves inventorying the consequences of a decision option,
monetizing the consequences, and then aggregating monetized values
115
to produce a net value of the option. Advocates of cost-benefit
analysis generally contend that policymakers should select the policy
116
option with the greatest net value.
The use-conflict framework and cost-benefit analysis thus both
frame policy decisions as choices among options, each of which has its
own set of consequences. Both approaches also emphasize the
tradeoffs that any decision option presents. For cost-benefit analysis,
these tradeoffs are represented as the balance of costs and benefits.
For the use-conflict framework, the tradeoffs are conceptualized as
conflicting uses that the law must manage. Unlike cost-benefit
analysis, however, the use-conflict framework does not necessarily
prescribe quantifying and monetizing consequences. Rather, the useconflict framework focuses on how a policy option affects
environmental uses, which can be measured in numerous ways, not
just in monetary terms. Indeed, effects on uses need not necessarily
even be quantified to be helpful in assisting lawmaking decisions.
This difference between cost-benefit analysis and the use-conflict
framework is crucial because it is cost-benefit analysis’s insistence
that policy effects “should be aligned along a single numerical
metric. . . . that often forces the [cost-benefit] analyst to adopt
117
methods of quantification and monetization that attract criticism.”
In part, this is because the analysis that attaches quantities and values
118
to potential outcomes inevitably requires normative judgments.
114. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 167 (1999) (“The reputation of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) among American
academics has never been as poor as it is today, while its popularity among agencies in the
United States government has never been greater.”).
115. See Graham, supra note 61, at 413 (describing the Kaldor-Hicks test and cost-benefit
analysis as methods of assessing risk).
116. See id. at 412 (“When multiple regulatory alternatives are compared, the preferred
alternative is the one that maximizes net benefits . . . .”).
117. Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 17 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 26, at 1576–80 (“A . . . fundamental flaw
of cost-benefit analysis is that it is unable to deliver on the promise of more objective and more
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Many environmental consequences are difficult to monetize because
they are not traded in markets and thus are often excluded from cost119
benefit analyses. Thus, although theoretically comprehensive in
scope, cost-benefit analysis often focuses on a relatively narrow range
of consequences that economists can readily monetize. At a deeper
level, even if cost-benefit analysis could encompass all consequences,
any attempt to attach monetary values to policy consequences
requires a value judgment, insofar as every valuation implicitly
120
assumes a baseline.
In short, the use-conflict framework organizes facts more
realistically, and with fewer submerged normative judgments, than
does cost-benefit analysis. The use-conflict framework shares with
cost-benefit analysis the ideal of a comprehensive evaluation of the
consequences of policy options, but it avoids the limitations and
biases that result from monetization.
Other analytical methods are more compatible with the useconflict framework. Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa
Heinzerling, strong critics of cost-benefit analysis, have proposed a
nonmonetary assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of
121
policy options, including a holistic deliberative process. Professors
Sidney Shapiro and Christopher Schroeder have proposed a
pragmatic regulatory analysis that would be “problem-oriented,
normative, discursive, and transparent,” facilitating “open-ended
qualitative evaluation of policy options that relies on discussion and
logic to vet empirical information and to develop social ends and
122
values.” Alternatively, life-cycle assessment aims to compile and
evaluate all of the inputs, outputs, and potential impacts of a product
transparent decision making.”); Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of
Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1455–56 (2005) (“[O]ne of the most
troubling aspect[s] of CBA lies in its false promise of determinacy—its pretense of objectivity
and scientific accuracy. When a number gets attached to something that is actually based on a
host of controversial assumptions and approximations, value judgments become hidden behind
a false veneer of scientific objectivity.”).
119. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 26, at 1578–80 (“Cost-benefit studies of
regulations . . . generally ignore other, nonquantified, health and environmental benefits. This
raises a serious problem because many benefits of environmental programs—including the
prevention of many nonfatal diseases and harms to the ecosystem—either have not been
quantified or are not capable of being quantified at this time.”).
120. See generally FARBER, supra note 1, at 99–101, 113 (describing methods of choosing
baselines).
121. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 212–16 (2004).
122. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 26, at 473, 476.
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or process throughout its life cycle, including every aspect of its
123
production, delivery, use, and disposal.
Like cost-benefit analysis and the use-conflict framework, each
of these analytical approaches posits a comprehensive evaluation of
policy consequences. Unlike cost-benefit analysis, but like the useconflict framework, these approaches do not attempt to monetize
consequences or to otherwise reduce them to a single numeric metric;
therefore, they provide leeway to characterize consequences in a
more multidimensional way than does cost-benefit analysis. But these
analytical methods allow analysts or lawmakers to attach normative
weight to consequences without focusing on the identification and
management of conflicts among environmental uses. They therefore
miss the insights that come from the use-conflict framework. Indeed,
these analytical approaches, although in important ways consistent
with the use-conflict framework, equally could be incorporated into
124
an environmental-harm framework, with its attendant pathologies.
Thus, although these analytical approaches are generally compatible
with the use-conflict framework, they do not include its core features
and are not adequate substitutes for it.
IV. INSIGHTS INTO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S CHALLENGES
This Part elaborates on the use-conflict framework, explaining
how the framework highlights some of the core challenges and
conundrums of environmental lawmaking.
A. Identifying Uses and Use Conflicts
A simple scenario within the use-conflict framework would
involve an environmental use that the person or persons who benefit
from it understand and appreciate—for example, visitors to a state
park who enjoy recreating in the park. Many environmental uses fit
this pattern, but more complicated situations abound. Some uses—
especially those in which the benefit is indirect—go unrecognized.
Even beneficiaries who are aware of their environmental uses may

123. DAVID F. CIAMBRONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS 3, 6 (1997); D.
ELCOCK, ARGONNE NAT’L LAB., NO. ANL/EVS/R-07/5, LIFE-CYCLE THINKING FOR THE OIL
AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION INDUSTRY 11 (2007), available at http://
www.evs.anl.gov/pub/doc/LCA_final_report.pdf; Stuart Ross & David Evans, Use of Life Cycle
Assessment in Environmental Management, 29 ENVTL. MGMT. 132, 133 (2002) (discussing the
steps of life-cycle assessment).
124. See supra Part I.B.
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not recognize when those uses conflict with other uses. Other
complications, such as the complexity of environmental relationships,
arise as well, making it impossible for lawmakers ever to understand
fully the use conflicts they are managing. These complications explain
many of the most difficult obstacles to effective management of
environmental resources.
First, people may or may not recognize their uses of
environmental resources. This lack of recognition sometimes arises
because the benefit a person ultimately derives from an
environmental resource is far removed from the resource, because the
benefit itself may be small, or both. A purchaser of fruit at a
supermarket probably gives little or no thought to the environmental
uses, such as pollination, that helped to grow the fruit.
Second, even direct and valuable environmental benefits may go
unrecognized. People do not need to know, for example, that the
stratospheric ozone layer absorbs ultraviolet radiation to benefit from
the ozone layer’s protection. They derive the benefit—that is, use the
resource—regardless of whether they appreciate or even are aware of
the benefit. And when someone enjoys environmental benefits more
indirectly, such as an owner of property that is protected from
flooding by upstream wetlands that absorb stormwater runoff, the
benefits are even more likely to go unrecognized and unappreciated.
Third, the lack of recognition of the benefit of the environmental
use is more than just taking the benefit for granted. Even the loss or
impairment of the use may not alert the beneficiary to the use’s
existence. For example, if a depleted ozone layer stopped absorbing
ultraviolet radiation, or bees stopped pollinating fruit trees, or
impaired wetlands stopped absorbing stormwater runoff, depriving
people of benefits they previously derived, those who are injured
might not attribute their impairment to the use of an environmental
resource. Nothing about the injury to their well-being—getting skin
damage, having to pay more for fruit, or having their property
flooded—necessarily indicates to them the source of the injury, which
is the impairment of their use of an environmental resource.
Thus, because people are unaware of many of their uses of
environmental resources, they may have little or no understanding of
how, or how much, they benefit from environmental resources. In
addition, even when people are aware of an environmental use, they
may not recognize conflicts between their uses and other uses.
Even users who are aware of the benefits they derive from an
environmental resource may not recognize when that use is impaired
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or threatened. Property owners may know that upstream wetlands
have protected their properties from flooding but may not realize
when those wetlands become filled with sediment. Even users who
realize their well-being has been reduced may not attribute that
reduction to the impaired environmental benefit. For example, even
after their properties are flooded, property owners still may not know
of the loss of upstream wetlands, even though the loss of the
upstream wetlands contributed to the flooding of their properties.
Moreover, even users who are aware of the benefit they derive
from an environmental resource and are aware that the use is
impaired may not trace their impaired use to the existence of
conflicting uses; they may misattribute the cause of their impairment
or not attribute it to any cause at all. Property owners may know
generally that upstream wetlands have protected their properties
from flooding, that some of those wetlands have been filled with
sediment, and that their properties have flooded, but they may not
realize that the filling of the wetlands contributed to the flooding. For
example, they may think the storm that caused the flooding was
unusually severe.
Third, when a use interferes with other uses, but is not impaired
by the interference, the interfering user is particularly unlikely to
recognize the conflict to which he contributes. If someone fills the
upstream wetlands that contribute to the downstream flooding, there
may not be any reason for that person to know of this effect of her
actions. Although, as Professor Ronald Coase has noted, the use
125
conflict is reciprocal in that it arises from both uses, the conflict
often is only perceived by the users whose uses are impaired and not
by those who do the impairing.
Together, these complications that obscure uses and use conflicts
create a context in which many members of society are largely
unaware of their interests in environmental resources and thus are
unlikely to assert their true interests. Individuals may not assert an
interest at all on the mistaken assumption that they lack a significant
interest, or they may participate unknowingly based on a
misunderstanding of their actual uses of the environmental resource
126
at issue.

125. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
126. Consideration of environmental uses also becomes complicated when people derive
satisfaction from someone else’s use of an environmental resource—for example, a person’s
satisfaction from the expectation that Yosemite National Park will be preserved in a condition
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Such conditions obviously complicate the task of effectively
managing environmental resources. This is not to say that the
beneficiaries of an environmental use are the only effective advocates
for their use. Scientific experts, public officials, and policy advocates
may represent and consider the interests of the unaware. But such
representation has its problematic aspects, not the least of which is
the difficulty in claiming to represent—and the lack of incentive to
represent—the interests of people who are unaware of their interests.
One of the goals of environmental law should therefore be to produce
and disseminate information about the existence of potential
conflicts, so that more people recognize their interests in an
environmental problem. Evidence seems to indicate, for example,
that the reporting of toxic chemical releases under the Toxic Release
Inventory has led companies to reduce their emissions, even when
127
they are not required by law to do so.
128
The ecosystem-services concept, in addition to helping clarify
the range of uses associated with environmental resources, also
advances the project of identifying relevant use conflicts. The idea
that people are unaware of many of the benefits (uses) they derive
from ecosystems underlies much of the work that has been done on
ecosystem services. To the extent that people unknowingly derive
benefits from ecosystems, those unappreciated benefits are unlikely
to factor into ex ante environmental decisionmaking.
Ecosystem-services advocates strive to understand the depth and
variety of means by which ecosystems contribute to well-being. This
assists the efforts of the use-conflict framework, which seeks to
highlight how environmental decisionmaking necessarily involves
choices among conflicting patterns of uses of environmental
resources. As environmental scientist Peter Kareiva and his coauthors

that will allow his grandchildren to enjoy it. Whether and how such altruistic appreciation
should be recognized and weighed in the lawmaking process poses interesting questions and
additional complications.
127. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 905, 944 (2008) (“Empirical studies have concluded that firms identified in TRI data
releases as being among the highest emitters in their industrial sectors experienced an abnormal
negative effect on firm stock value and subsequently reduced emissions more than those who
were among the lowest emitters, even where emissions reductions were not mandated by law.”);
see also Vandenbergh, supra note 50, at 1107 (“Behavior change should occur if the individual is
provided with the information necessary to enable rational decision-making. Individuals also
have incentives to change behavior when they expect that their behavior will trigger the social
sanctions that can be levied in close-knit group settings.”).
128. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
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recently noted in Science, “Because managers and researchers have
tended to focus on impacts rather than tradeoffs, there has been no
systematic examination of tradeoffs in a way that leads to a useful
theory. . . . A more durable stewardship would manage tradeoffs
among ecosystem services so that nature and people simultaneously
129
thrive.” Completely informed environmental decisionmaking would
require an understanding not just of the variety of ecosystem services
derived from an environmental resource but also of the complex
network of interrelationships—potential conflicts, as well as
130
compatibilities—among those uses.
But fully informed, rational use-conflict balancing is impossible.
People incompletely understand how they use the environment and
how their various uses interrelate, and they often understand even
less how various policy options might affect the balance of their uses.
This dualism is a core conundrum of environmental law. Lawmakers
are managing that which they—and indeed society—only somewhat
understand.
Thus, although the use-conflict framework rests on the
understanding that environmental decisionmaking necessarily entails
balancing among competing uses, the framework does not necessarily
purport that use conflicts can be determined with accuracy or
precision or that lawmaking institutions must determine use conflicts
with accuracy or precision to make environmental law.
Environmental decisionmaking effects a balance among conflicting
uses of an environmental resource, but it often is difficult or
impossible to determine ex ante—and perhaps even ex post—exactly
what that balance will be and how it will affect people.
B. The Role of Values
Unlike an environmental-harm approach, which conceals
normativity, a use-conflict framework exposes normativity by
focusing on how decisionmakers choose among conflicting
environmental uses. Normative arguments in environmental law
make claims about the proper relationship among conflicting uses.

129. Kareiva et al., supra note 32, at 1869.
130. Cf. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 901 (1997)
(“As our understanding of ecological services develops . . . it well may be possible with a degree
of certainty to establish connections between identifiable injuries and specific harms to services
such as pollination or water retention.”).
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Values can represent the normative criteria by which people choose
among conflicting uses.
Choices among potential uses of environmental resources occur
at two different levels, both of which involve values. First, users apply
values to choose among available options for using environmental
resources. Second, lawmaking institutions apply values to choose
among available options for managing uses of environmental
resources. This Article is focused on understanding lawmaking, so it
focuses on values as employed in that context. But, because the two
levels are related, its exploration of values touches on individual
values as well. Both sets of choices affect the balance of uses.
Moreover, each set of choices affects the other. The preferences of
users help to define the context in which lawmakers manage uses, and
lawmaking choices establish parameters that help to shape the
balance of uses.
This Section explores the values and interests at play in
environmental decisionmaking at both the user level and the
lawmaker level, their relationship to uses, and their role in
environmental lawmaking.
Although values “is a complicated term involving myriad
131
definitions,” common to most definitions is the notion that values

131. Terre Satterfield, Paul Slovic & Robin Gregory, Narrative Valuation in a Policy
Judgment Context, 34 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 315, 316 (2000); see also Thomas C. Brown, The
Concept of Value in Resource Allocation, 60 LAND ECON. 231, 231 (1984) (observing that “value
has many meanings”); Dietz et al., supra note 89, at 336–37 (noting that the concept of values is
utilized in several different disciplines, including philosophy, economics, sociology, social
psychology, and political science, but that “these streams of research are not well integrated”
and “as we move across the research traditions, the term values is used in somewhat different
ways”). The question of how to define values has been widely discussed in academic literature.
See WILLETT KEMPTON, JAMES S. BOSTDER & JENNIFER A. HARTLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL
VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 12 (1995) (defining values as “guiding principles of what is
moral, desirable, or just”); MILTON ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND VALUES: A THEORY
OF ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE 160 (1968) (defining values as “enduring belief[s] that a
specific mode of conduct . . . is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of
conduct or end-states of existence”); Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law
and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 241 (2003) (“By values, I mean the
attitudes toward things and people that provide the underlying motivations for human
behavior.”); Shalom H. Schwartz & Wolfgang Bilsky, Toward a Universal Psychological
Structure of Human Values, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 550, 551 (1987) (“[V]alues
are (a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend
specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered
by relative importance.”); John Zaller, Information, Values, and Opinion, 85 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1215, 1216 (1991) (“Values, as I use the term, refers to any relatively stable, individuallevel predisposition to accept or reject particular types of arguments.” (emphasis omitted)).
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are the bases by which people make decisions. In particular, values
are often conceptualized as the criteria by which people choose
among competing options when there are tradeoffs among the
133
available options. Because of their role in shaping action and
decisions, values are “a fundamental building block of human
134
behavior.” Values include not just material worth, but also the
moral, ethical, social, and spiritual belief systems that influence
135
human preferences.
On this understanding, people’s values drive their decisions
about the appropriate uses of environmental resources. But the
converse may hold true as well: environmental uses may play a
formative role in shaping attitudes and values about which uses are
appropriate.
First, uses affect attitudes about uses because experience
136
generates information, and information shapes attitudes. To form
an attitude requires information, and one of the most important ways
people receive information about an environmental resource is
through using it. Moreover, the information people gain from the
experience of using an environmental resource is not neutral among
the various potential uses of the resource. Rather, using a resource
tends to highlight the benefits of that use and how other uses may
impair that use. The experience of fishing in a stream teaches the
angler the benefits of fishing and informs her of the conditions that
make a stream preferable for fishing; the experience of fishing is
132. E.g., Dietz et al., supra note 89, at 338, 340, 341, 356 (noting the common understanding
that values influence how people make decisions); More et al., supra note 82, at 398 (“[T]he
various conceptions of value share the common idea that values are guides to decisionmaking.”); More et al., supra note 82, at 399 (stating that values “serve as criteria that people
use to make judgments; that is, values specify the relationship between one thing and another”).
133. Dietz et al., supra note 89, at 340–41, 356.
134. William G. Jacoby, Value Choices and American Public Opinion, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI.
706, 706–07 (2006).
135. Satterfield et al., supra note 131, at 316; see also Lockwood, supra note 82, at 9
(“Individual actors compose decisions from values that are a product of individual experience,
predisposition and understanding, as shaped by a complex of social, cultural, environmental and
economic influences. Such composition constitutes an act of integration . . . .”).
136. Attitudes refers to a person’s evaluative judgment about something. See P. Wesley
Schultz, Chris Shriver, Jennifer J. Tabanico & Azar M. Khazian, Implicit Connections with
Nature, 24 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 31, 31 (2004); see also Dietz et al., supra note 89, at 346 (“Values
differ from attitudes in that attitudes are positive or negative evaluations of something quite
specific.”); Paul C. Stern & Thomas Dietz, The Value Basis of Environmental Concern, 50 J.
SOC. ISSUES 65, 67 (1994) (“[P]eople construct their attitudes on the basis of their expectations
about how the attitude object (such as an environmental condition) affects the particular sets of
people or things they value.”).
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unlikely to give the angler any information about the benefits of
discharging industrial wastewater into streams. It may, however, give
the angler information about how industrial wastewater impairs
fishing. The more anglers fish in a stream, the more information will
be available and distributed about the benefits of fishing in the stream
and the ways in which other uses of the stream impair fishing. Uses
may generate information about their negative consequences as well.
For example, the problem of overfishing may become more apparent
and more understood when overfishing actually has occurred.
People’s attitude about an environmental resource thus depends on
what they know about it, and what people know about an
environmental resource depends in significant part on how they use
it.
Second, experience also shapes values. People value the familiar
137
138
over the unfamiliar; this is called the “mere exposure effect.”
People also value what they have more than they value what they do
not have; this is called the “loss aversion” or the “endowment
139
effect.” The mere fact that people use a resource or have managed a
resource in a certain way therefore leads them to prefer that use or
management scheme over other options, independent of, or in
addition to, any other reason for preferring that option.
If people’s uses of environmental resources originated from
preexisting autonomous preferences, then the effect of environmental
uses on values would merely indicate that uses are a means by which
values reinforce themselves and resist change. That is to say, it would
indicate that people’s values determine their uses, which in turn
support their values. But factors other than values—for example,
historical patterns and other constraints beyond people’s individual
control—also shape uses. Some use options, for example, may not
have been technologically or economically viable in the past. Existing
patterns of uses of environmental resources instill a bias in favor of

137. See, e.g., TRYGG ENGEN, ODOR SENSATION & MEMORY 111 (1991) (reporting that
individuals prefer familiar odors over unfamiliar odors); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF
RISK 141 (2000) (reporting that people prefer familiar risks over unfamiliar ones); David J.
Hargreaves, Verbal and Behavioral Responses to Familiar and Unfamiliar Music, 6 CURRENT
PSYCHOL. RES. & REVS. 323, 327 (1987) (finding that study subjects significantly favored
familiar music over unfamiliar music).
138. Angela Y. Lee, The Mere Exposure Effect: An Uncertainty Reduction Explanation
Revisited, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1255, 1255 (2001).
139. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990).
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existing uses, thereby exerting a potentially powerful influence on
environmental decisionmaking that favors established uses. In short,
uses may be creating values that support them. This effect is in
addition to other forces that favor existing uses, such as
investments—both social and economic—that have been made in
existing uses.
Work in other fields supports the proposition that environmental
uses affect values. Empirical psychological studies suggest that
“objects . . . are valued because of the degree to which they are
140
included within an individual’s cognitive representation of self.”
When people feel interconnected with nature, they tend to value
141
nature. Based on these results, psychologist P. Wesley Schultz has
posited that engaging in activities that lead people to feel
interconnected with nature tends to instill in them a concern for the
environment, whereas engaging in activities that lead people to feel
separated from nature likely reduces their concern for the
142
environment. In other words, how people use the environment
likely affects how they value the environment, with their values
supporting their uses. Similarly, economists Alan Randall and John
Stoll maintain that prior use of an environmental resource in some
form “seem[s] essential” to appreciation of the existence of the
143
resource. And philosopher Bryan Norton argues that some uses of
environmental resources do not merely satisfy existing preferences
144
but also help to shape values that will influence future decisions.
140. P. Wesley Schultz, The Structure of Environmental Concern: Concern for Self, Other
People, and the Biosphere, 21 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 327, 336 (2001) [hereinafter Schultz, Structure of
Environmental Concern]; see also P. Wesley Schultz, Empathizing with Nature: The Effects of
Perspective Taking on Concern for Environmental Issues, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 391, 401 (2000)
[hereinafter Schultz, Empathizing with Nature] (“These objects are valued because they are
included in a person’s cognitive representation of self.”).
141. Schultz, Structure of Environmental Concern, supra note 140, at 336.
142. Schultz, Empathizing with Nature, supra note 140, at 403.
143. Randall & Stoll, supra note 82, at 268 (contending that “activities combining Q [an
environmental resource] and X [a household’s consumption of goods and services] in some
previous time periods seem essential to the acquisition of the kinds of T [an activity production
technology that permits the household to understand and appreciate the resource] which permit
existence activities”).
144. See Andrew Brennan, Moral Pluralism and the Environment, 1 ENVTL. VALUES 15, 19–
20 (1992) (citing BRYAN NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? (1987)) (discussing
Norton’s theory of demand values and transformative values). On the related question of
whether outdoor contact increases one’s likelihood of holding environmentalist values,
anthropologists Willett Kempton, James Boster, and Jennifer Hartley note, “Only a few studies
have investigated the relationship of outdoor contact with environmental sentiment, some
finding a statistically significant but weak relationship.” KEMPTON ET AL., supra note 131, at 56
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The role of uses in shaping values may have important
implications for normative questions. First, it provides a potential
basis for questioning deference to existing values. To the extent that
existing values merely reflect, for example, a preference for the
familiar over the unfamiliar, they may be less normatively attractive
than if existing values are presumed to reflect, for example, ethical or
moral principles. Second, the role of uses in shaping values suggests
that managing uses of environmental resources may entail, whether
intentionally or not, managing values about uses of environmental
resources as well. The complicated relationship between values and
environmental uses is fertile ground for additional empirical and
theoretical inquiry.
C. Values Conflicts versus Use Conflicts
Given the centrality of values to environmental decisionmaking,
and, in particular, their role in shaping preferences for some uses over
others, one could argue that environmental lawmaking should be
conceptualized as conflicts of values rather than conflicts of uses.
That is, one could argue for the adoption of a values-conflict
framework that includes uses instead of a use-conflict framework that
includes values. Indeed, some scholars who have theorized about the
role of values in environmental decisions have contended that
145
environmental controversies are fundamentally conflicts of values.
The problem with understanding environmental lawmaking in terms
of values is that values, on their own and untethered to uses, suffer
from similar conceptual difficulties to environmental harm as a basis
for analyzing environmental lawmaking.
Just as not all environmental problems necessarily involve
environmental harm, not all environmental problems can be reduced
to conflicts over values. Some environmental disputes would dissipate
if there were widespread values consensus. If all Americans shared a
strong commitment to protecting endangered species, there would be
less controversy over applications of the Endangered Species Act.
(citing Edward E. Langenau, Jr., R. Ben Peyton, Julie M. Wickham, Edward W. Caveney &
David W. Johnston, Attitudes Toward Oil and Gas Development Among Forest Recreationists,
16 J. LEISURE RES. 161 (1984)). Moreover, these studies do not “distinguish which came first—
the environmentalist leanings or the outdoor experience.” Id.
145. See, e.g., EVERNDEN, supra note 31, at 5 (contending that debates between
environmentalists and industrialists are “actually about what constitutes a good life”); Martin
Nie, Drivers of Natural Resource-Based Political Conflict, 36 POL’Y SCI. 307, 307–08 (2003)
(identifying “competing human values” as the core of political conflicts).
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Many disputes, however, would not diminish. If everyone agreed that
a watershed should be managed to maximize the extraction of
irrigation water for agriculture, this consensus of values and attitudes
would not necessarily alleviate controversies over which irrigators
should get water, how much they should get, and when. Indeed, some
environmental disputes would be exacerbated by a values consensus.
If everyone favored snowmobiling in Yellowstone National Park,
demand for a scarce resource would increase dramatically,
intensifying use conflicts. Even if there were value consensus,
competition among users of the resource would persist.
Uses even play an integral role in resolving issues that involve
conflicting values and that initially might appear primarily to pose
questions of values. Conflicting potential uses of environmental
resources provide the medium for values conflicts in environmental
decisionmaking. With environmental issues, for the most part, values
conflict in a relevant way only insofar as they support conflicting uses
of environmental resources. One person’s (Polluter) preference for
emitting pollutants into the air from his factory and another’s
(Breather) preference for breathing clean air result in a salient
dispute only when their desired uses conflict—that is, when Polluter’s
emissions pollute the air Breather breathes or when regulations
limiting emissions preclude Polluter from emitting as much pollution
as he would like. There may be uncertainty, however, about whether
or how Polluter’s emissions affect the air Breather breathes, and
many decisions about restricting air pollution are not made on a
source-by-source basis, but rather for a group of sources. So Breather
may be concerned about a decision to allow additional emissions of
air pollutants even without clear evidence that the emissions will
affect her breathing. But Breather is unlikely to oppose Polluter’s
emissions in the absence of any perceived consequence. Breather’s
values—and her attention—are triggered only upon perception of a
146
risk of an impairment to a use of concern to her.
Uses also provide a vital frame of reference by which to assess
values. Values separated from uses can be nebulous. People may use
broad, abstract values terminology to describe the normative

146. This is not to suggest that a person could only be concerned about her own breathing
and not that of others. Breather thus may vicariously benefit when others breathe clean air and
may perceive a use conflict when Polluter’s emissions affect others’ breathing—not hers. But in
the absence of a perceived risk to a use that concerns Breather, she is unlikely to care about
Polluter’s emissions.
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concerns that guide their decisionmaking, but someone would need to
apply the value to a use to understand what the value she claims
motivates her actually means. Just as a stated goal of protecting the
environment elides many of the complexities and complications of
environmental lawmaking, advocating in terms of a broad value, such
as promoting recreational access, provides little concrete insight
about how one would propose to manage an environmental resource.
Values are by no means unimportant, but they are best examined as
they are channeled into weighing competing uses, rather than in the
147
abstract.
V. NEUTRAL BASELINES
This Article has argued that a use-conflict framework reveals
some of the hidden normativity in environmental debates. The useconflict framework describes environmental problems and
environmental lawmaking conceptually in a manner that exposes
normative premises and attempts to establish common ground across
diverse normative perspectives. In other words, the use-conflict
framework offers the possibility of a descriptive, analytical approach
to understanding environmental lawmaking that avoids implicit
baselines.
As Professors Jack Beermann and Joseph Singer have observed,
“unstated baselines” that “define the normative starting points of
148
legal analysis” pervade legal reasoning.
“Baselines embody
important moral and political choices, but because they are starting
points for analysis, they tend to suppress discussion of these
149
choices.” “[W]hen the baselines are revealed, a clearer picture of

147. In addition, although people may think of values primarily as determinants of decisions
about use, values and attitudes themselves appear to derive to some extent from uses. See
discussion supra Part IV.B. People’s uses of environmental resources are what give the
resources meaning to them; uses reflect values, but they also shape values. Thus, in
conceptualizing environmental decisionmaking, values do not stand in an unequivocally prior or
superior position to uses.
148. Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning:
The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 915 (1989); see also id. at 933 (“Ideology
and observation combine to form empirical baselines, or starting points, against which all
situations are measured. Empirical observations are thus tied to a normative vision of the world.
One’s social vision, as embodied in empirical baselines, allows one, in the absence of clear
evidence, to evaluate competing empirical claims. Ideology affects a person’s judgment about
which stories to believe.”).
149. Id. at 916.
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150

the issues involved . . . is presented.” The use-conflict framework
draws more explicit attention to baseline questions by describing
environmental problems without hidden baselines. This stands in
contrast to the environmental-harm approach, which submerges its
151
normative assumptions in implicit baselines.
In arguing for the advantages of stripping baselines from
descriptive analyses in an effort to expose concealed normativity, the
use-conflict framework for environmental law rests on foundations
152
that Coase laid in The Problem of Social Cost. In that classic work,
Coase emphasized that land-use conflicts, in which the owner of one
piece of property interferes with another property owner’s use of her
153
land, are “a problem of a reciprocal nature.” That is, to take an

150. Id. at 915.
151. See supra Part I.B.2.
152. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
153. Id. at 2. Having made the reciprocity observation, Coase went on to address its
normative implications. From the perspective of welfare economics, the normative prescription
for resolving a conflict between conflicting land uses should seek the efficient outcome, which
maximizes the overall value of the land uses. See id. at 34 (“When an economist is comparing
alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare the social product yielded
by these different arrangements.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules:
The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 609 (2001) (“The most efficient
resolution of the conflicting-use problem is the outcome that would maximize total aggregate
value . . . .”). Coase’s most famous insight was that when transaction costs are low, private
ordering should reach this optimal result because the affected parties should bargain to the
highest-value outcome. See Coase, supra note 152, at 2–8; see also id. at 15 (noting that his
analysis has assumed no transaction costs and that this is “a very unrealistic assumption”). This
is the aspect of Coase’s analysis that tends to draw the attention of scholars and that has become
known as the Coase Theorem. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107
MICH. L. REV. 757, 767 (2009) (“Where conflicts over resources arise, a corresponding
preference is often found for legal rules that facilitate bargaining—again, with the presumption
that clear property rights do just that.”); Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science:
Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 971–72 (2009) (“Coase
famously posited that in the absence of transaction costs, parties would freely negotiate over the
disposition of resources to achieve efficient outcomes.”); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural
Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 517 (2009) (“Coase
argued that absent transaction costs, parties can efficiently rearrange rights irrespective of their
initial assignment.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional
Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 28 n.53
(2008) (“[T]he Coasean argument [is] that an absolute property rule . . . would achieve [a
socially efficient] result when transaction costs are zero, because open-market bargaining will
always cause the property to be assigned to the party that places a higher value on it.”).
But one need not agree with the normative argument to benefit from Coase’s
descriptive observations regarding the reciprocity of use conflicts. Indeed, Coase himself did not
advocate private ordering as the solution for all land-use conflicts. To the contrary, he readily
understood that a situation in which transaction costs are negligible is “a very unrealistic
assumption.” Coase, supra note 152, at 15. The operations necessary for private ordering to
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example from an environmental case often linked to Coase, a
cement plant that emanates dirt, smoke, and vibrations may interfere
with neighboring landowners’ use of their properties, but if the
landowners could force the cement plant to cease operation, that
155
would interfere with the plant owners’ use of their property. As
Coase summarized, “If we are to discuss the problem in terms of
156
causation, both parties cause the damage.” Coase’s observation of
the reciprocity of causation in land-use conflicts is simple, but it
differs dramatically from the traditional and intuitive
conceptualization of such conflicts, in which people tend to ascribe
responsibility for a land-use conflict to only one of the conflicting
uses.
The benefit of Coase’s reciprocity observation—and what makes
it both analytically valuable and intuitively unsettling—is that it strips
out the normative baseline that people almost invariably—and often
157
subconsciously—presume into any situation. By removing the
resolve conflicts “are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many
transactions.” Id. Moreover, Coase recognized that even when private transactions could reach
the efficient result, the efficient result was not necessarily the best result. Coase believed that
“the choice between different social arrangements . . . should be carried out in broader terms
than [merely comparing market value],” advocating instead “that the total effect of these
arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account.” Id. at 43; see also id. (opining
that “problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and
morals”).
Although Coase recognized the problems that may arise by relying on private ordering
to resolve use conflicts, he did not see governmental regulation as a panacea. Regulation is
associated with its own set of costs and difficulties, leading Coase to conclude that “direct
governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be
solved by the market or the firm.” Id. at 18. Coase thus posed the problem as “one of choosing
the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with the harmful effects” in a context in which
“[a]ll solutions have costs.” Id.
154. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of
the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 400 (1997) (using the cement-plant example to explain
the Coase Theorem); George P. Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance,
29 VT. L. REV. 687, 715–17 (2005) (same); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the
Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1038–40 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion and
Property Rules] (same).
155. E.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871–72 (N.Y. 1970).
156. Coase, supra note 152, at 13; see also Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note
154, at 966 (“[O]ne of the prime results of the economic analysis of law has been to cast doubt
on ordinary notions of causation in favor of an economically more sophisticated view in which
use conflicts exhibit symmetric causality . . . .”).
157. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1679
n.37 (1989) (“Coase’s reciprocal view of causation impeaches the Pigouvian analysis by
demonstrating that the Pigouvian approach improperly treats the externality ‘victim’ activity as
a fixed baseline.”); cf. Farber, supra note 71, at 686 (linking Coase to baseline neutrality); Louis
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baseline or by revealing an implicit baseline, Coase’s reciprocity
observation exposes concealed normativity and expands the range of
conceivable policy options. That is, when someone describes the
cement plant case as one in which the cement plant is harming its
neighbors, she assumes that the neighbors have a baseline right not to
be interfered with by the cement plant, and her goal automatically
becomes redressing the neighbors’ injuries. The reciprocity
observation—which illuminates that the choice is between allowing
the cement plant to harm the neighbors or allowing the neighbors to
harm the cement plant—expands the range of alternatives considered
and forces justification of the choice among those alternatives. It may
well be that the neighbors should have a right not to be interfered
with by the cement plant and therefore have an injury that should be
redressed, but that is a normative position that should be defended,
rather than presumed. In other words, to the extent that one wants to
use a baseline, it should be justified with a normative argument and
not assumed into a putatively neutral factual description of the
158
problem.
To observe that conflicting uses, whether of land or of
environmental resources, are reciprocal causes of a conflict is not to
claim that they are otherwise symmetrical or that they are
159
normatively equivalent. Asymmetries abound in environmental law.
160
A single pollution source may affect large numbers of people.
Activities at one location may have environmental effects over a
Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law and the
Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 122–23 (1996) (“Instead of a fixed, formalist
baseline . . . , Coase viewed baselines as up for grabs . . . .”).
158. The use-conflict framework, in addition to incorporating Coase’s reciprocity
observation, takes into account the full range of relationships among uses, which are not limited
to conflicts. Although use conflicts create problems, synergies and compatibilities among uses
also play an important role in shaping human relationships with environmental resources and in
defining options for managing those relationships. See, e.g., supra notes 98–99 and
accompanying text.
159. Dan Farber has argued that “treat[ing] entitlements as presumptively unallocated . . .
implicitly assumes away any moral differences between the positions of the two sides by giving
equal weight to their interests.” Farber, supra note 71, at 686. In fact, however, a neutral
baseline that treats entitlements as initially unallocated merely strips away normative
assumptions—not all normative judgments—and requires any weighing of interests to be
justified, rather than presumed.
160. See, e.g., NPL Site Narrative for Omaha Lead, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/
sites/npl/nar1660.htm (last updated Apr. 2003) (noting that approximately 65,615 residents of
Omaha, Nebraska live on soil contaminated by lead, primarily from air emissions from a leadsmelting facility); see also National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 68
Fed. Reg. 23,077, 23,081 (Apr. 30, 2003) (including Omaha Lead in its list of sites).
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broad area. Environmental effects may be irreversible. Some users
163
are politically more powerful than others. Some environmental
benefits and costs may be reflected in the market, while others are
164
not. Certain users likely have more information about their uses
165
than others do.
Nothing about the use-conflict framework, and in particular
about its observation that use conflicts are reciprocal, denies these
asymmetries or their potential normative relevance. Indeed, if
anything, the use-conflict framework, by focusing on use conflicts,
highlights the asymmetries between conflicting uses. As for normative
equivalence, observing that the law could allow the cement plant to
harm the neighbors through its pollution or could allow the neighbors
to harm the cement plant by shutting it down does not suggest that
lawmakers or the people they represent should be indifferent
between these two options. Rather, it merely suggests that they
should be aware that they have a choice between the options and
should be conscious of the criteria by which they make that choice.
Professor Farber has criticized neutral baselines in
environmental analysis on two grounds. First, he contends that
neutral baselines are not actually neutral. Any analysis, he claims,

161. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What’s
Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1597–98 (1991) (noting how tall
smokestacks from industrial sources broadly disperse air pollution).
162. See LAZARUS, supra note 12, at 11 (“Such effects may take the form of the extinction
of a species, the depletion of a fossil fuel resource, or the destruction of a unique land
formation.”).
163. See Sinden, supra note 118, at 1436–37 (2005) (“Environmental disputes involve
asymmetries of power that consistently skew government decision making in favor of less
stringent environmental regulation.”); see also Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure,
Administrative Incentives and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1673 (1991) (“Industry
representatives appear regularly in agency proceedings and can usually afford to offer detailed
comments and criticisms on possible agency decisions, while environmental groups intervene on
an intermittent basis and the unorganized public seldom participates at all.”).
164. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300,
305 (1995) (“[T]he environmental consequences of unregulated market transactions are not
reflected in price, and thus these consequences, and their effects on others, are not taken into
account in market behavior.”).
165. See Karkkainen, supra note 59, at 1414–15 (“Generally, industries know more about
their own production technologies and cost curves, and are better positioned than regulatory
agencies to determine the nature and extent of their waste byproducts (whether or not they
actually pay attention to them) and to evaluate the cost, effectiveness, and unintended
consequences of applying particular pollution-control technologies to their own industrial
processes.”).
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“implicitly assumes a baseline.” “However we make environmental
167
decisions, value choices are necessary.” Farber shows, for example,
as other critics of cost-benefit analysis have, how attaching monetary
values to policy consequences is a nonneutral value judgment in the
guise of a neutral position, insofar as every valuation implicitly
168
assumes an entitlement.
Second, Farber argues that neutrality among values is not
actually advantageous. Government should be able to take actions
that favor particular values, Farber asserts, provided that the values
“are reasonable (in light of our culture as a whole) and so long as the
169
individual rights of dissenters are respected.” If the law did not
allow government action in favor of such values, society would be
deprived of many programs that most would agree provide social
170
benefits.
Farber may be correct in both of his criticisms of neutral
baselines in the way he has applied them to prescriptions for
environmental lawmaking. Indeed, his underlying contention that
favoring some values over others is both necessary and beneficial is
entirely consonant with the use-conflict framework, which
acknowledges the central role of values in decisionmaking. But his
criticisms of neutrality do not apply well—and are presumably not
intended for—descriptive analytical frameworks. For descriptive
analytical frameworks, neutrality—especially in the form of stripping
normative baselines out of the analysis—is for the most part both
possible and desirable.
Whereas decisions require values, describing a problem and the
related available options does not necessarily require favoring one
normative stance over another. Farber has argued that a neutral
baseline “implicitly assumes away any moral differences between the
171
positions of the two sides by giving equal weight to their interests.”
This is a disadvantage for a normative framework—if nothing else, it

166. FARBER, supra note 1, at 99.
167. Id. at 122.
168. See, e.g., id. at 99–101, 113 (“Under this standard, instead of asking what people would
pay to get cleaner air, you ask what price they would demand before agreeing to accept air
pollution.”).
169. Id. at 109.
170. See id. at 109–10 (“The government need not be neutral between people holding these
values and those who would prefer a sterile world with no organic life apart from humans and
their agricultural inventory.”).
171. Farber, supra note 71, at 686.
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invites the encroachment of submerged values. For a descriptive
framework, however, adopting a value-inclusive analysis—that is,
describing the decision context in a manner amenable to the broadest
possible range of viewpoints—forces any proponent of an option to
make its value advocacy explicit, thereby promoting constructive
debate.
The use-conflict framework focuses on the empirical and
normative relationships among environmental uses. Every policy
option
distributes
advantages
and
disadvantages
among
environmental uses. The use-conflict framework accordingly calls for
the proponents of a policy to justify its normative weighing of uses. In
doing so, the framework acknowledges the potential validity of all
uses, including those that the policy would impair. As Professors
Beermann and Singer have noted, forcing normative questions out of
hidden baselines and into explicit normative argument broadens the
range of perspectives represented in the debate and facilitates
172
thoughtful choices among those perspectives.
It may seem that the use-conflict framework, which attempts to
describe environmental law without favoring a particular normative
perspective, conflicts with the longstanding argument that no analysis
173
can be entirely value neutral. More recently, cultural cognition
theory has highlighted how, in many public policy debates, factual
174
disagreements may be traceable to underlying differences in values.

172. Beerman & Singer, supra note 148, at 915; see also id. at 916 (“By identifying these
baselines and by unpacking their contents, we hope to open up the discussion to explicit
consideration of the suppressed moral and political questions underlying employment-at-will.”);
id. at 995 (“[W]e should make our moral arguments explicit and we should try to understand
how our moral viewpoints shape our entire approach to problems.”); id. (“Bringing competing
baselines to the forefront of the analysis allows us to highlight the moral and political choices
implicit in choices among competing rules. It therefore will help us make better decisions by
clarifying the value choices involved in the decision.”).
173. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 17 (1980) (“[T]here is
no escaping the theoretical requirement that a judgment of significance and importance must be
made if theory is to be more than a vast rubbish heap of miscellaneous facts described in a
multitude of incommensurable terminologies.”); Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1713 (1996) (“[D]escribing is always done from the point of view of
certain values and in that way expresses those values.”); Talcott Parsons, Introduction to MAX
WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 1, 11 (Talcott Parsons ed.,
1947) (noting Max Weber’s position that explanation required “a frame of reference which was
inherently abstractive and selective with respect to the facts treated as relevant and their mode
of statement”).
174. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006) (“[C]ulture is prior to facts in the cognitive sense that
what citizens believe about the empirical consequences of those policies derives from their
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Regardless of whether these arguments hold true in all contexts, they
apply with great force to environmental lawmaking, in which
uncertainties are pervasive and factual determinations inevitably
175
require considerable amounts of judgment, which is susceptible to
176
influence from one’s values. Thus, to the extent that the use-conflict
framework assumes the possibility of values-free descriptive analysis,
it is incompatible with cultural cognition theory and other critiques of
the value-fact dichotomy.
Despite its efforts toward neutrality among viewpoints, however,
the use-conflict framework does not pretend that values can or should
be stripped from policy discussions. Rather, the framework’s
objective is to expose and highlight normativity, so that a diversity of
normative claims can be aired and debated fairly. Other analytical
approaches channel the effects of environmental policy options into
categories, such as environmental harm, that internalize implicit
normative judgments about the effects’ desirability.
The use-conflict framework, by contrast, is in several different
ways inclusive and respectful of a broad range of interests and values.
First, the framework’s focus on environmental uses acknowledges the
stake of anyone who purports to derive a benefit from an
environmental resource. Second, the framework’s precept that policy
options should be evaluated in terms of how they advantage and
disadvantage environmental uses further promotes inclusivity by not
excluding or prejudging the normative weight that should attach to an
interest. Finally, the use-conflict framework, by emphasizing the
reciprocity of environmental-use conflicts and how environmental

cultural worldviews. Based on a variety of overlapping psychological mechanisms, individuals
accept or reject empirical claims about the consequences of controversial policies based on their
vision of a good society.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 115, 118–25 (2007) (“[T]o the extent that it is driven by affect, risk perception is
necessarily conditioned by culture.”); Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John
Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071,
1083–88 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005)) (“The claim behind cultural cognition is that culture is prior to facts in
societal disputes over risk.”).
175. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 181, 184 (“Rather than shying away from scientific facts and figures in the development of
environmental law as one might expect, Congress may often be relying too heavily on the
scientific enterprise to guide its lawmaking in the area of environmental protection.”).
176. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 174, at 164–65 (“The same psychological and social
processes that induce individuals to form factual beliefs consistent with their cultural orientation
will also prevent them from perceiving contrary empirical data to be credible.”).
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policies manage use conflicts by balancing conflicting environmental
uses, simultaneously validates all interests.
CONCLUSION
The use-conflict framework postulates that environmental
lawmaking is best understood in terms of the empirical and normative
relationships among environmental uses. Unlike approaches that
carry hidden normative baselines and thereby stunt thoughtful
deliberation, the use-conflict framework’s focus on relationships
among uses of environmental resources establishes a neutral baseline
that empowers meaningful debate among competing normative
perspectives. It brings within its ambit the broadest range of
considerations relevant to environmental problems. The use-conflict
framework is a way of thinking systematically and analytically about
environmental problems, and of promoting open dialogue about
competing values without adopting or rejecting the precepts of any
particular normative theory.

